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ABSTRACT
RECOGNITION LATENCIES, PSYCHOLINGUISTIC REALITY AND 
STATISTICAL GENERALITY: A PROBE STUDY OF ADVERBIAL
CLAUSES WITH LANGUAGE MATERIALS 
ANALYZED AS A RANDOM FACTOR
by
JANET MARIE LANG
A psycholinguistic account of sentence interpreta­
tion is constrained by facts about natural languages and 
facts about mental processing. The effects of a structural 
variable, clause type (subordinate or main), and a perceptual 
variable, clause order (first clause or second) in complex 
sentences with adverbial clauses were investigated using the 
probe-latency paradigm. Analyses of reaction times yielded 
a terminative interaction between the two variables. That is, 
for main clauses only, probes from less recent clauses 
evoked reliably longer reaction times than probes from the 
most recent clause; and, only for the most recently heard 
clauses, subordinate-clause probes evoked reliably longer 
reaction times than main-clause probes. Probes from clauses 
that were less recent and subordinate did not evoke reaction 
times that were different from either most recent subordinate- 
clause probes or less recent main-clause probes. These
xli
results were discussed in relation to theoretical models of 
immediate storage and retrieval of sentential material.
The methodological bases for including filler 
sentences was illustrated. It was suggested that the 
inclusion and analysis of filler sentences measurably 
increased both the internal auJ external validity of the 
experimental analysis.
Exploratory research regarding the effects of various 
types of probe words was reported. Probe words that rhyme 
with words in the sentence had the longest reaction times 
(as compared with probes either from the sentence or not 
from the sentence and not related to any word in the 
sentence). This effect corresponded with a previous finding 
that rhyme probes were quite difficult for students who were 
learning English as a second language. It was suggested that 
the magnitude of this confusion effect may be of use as an 
index of listening comprehension skills.
In all analyses (experimental and filler), both sub­
jects and language materials were considered to be random or 
sample variables. F^, and min F' statistics were com­
puted for all effects. In all cases, effects that were 
significant in one analysis were significant in all analyses; 
effects that were nonsignificant in one analysis were non­
significant in all analyses. Results supported the view 
that if the power of the underlying F^ and F2 analyses are 
comparable, then the min F 1 is not an overly stringent test 
of experimental hypotheses, although it is a mathematically
xiii
conservative test.
Statistical and empirical approaches to the problem 
of generality were critically examined. It was concluded 
that if prescriptive formulae for generality are to be use­
ful, they must be embedded in explicit theoretical con­
ceptions of the phenomena under investigation.
xiv
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation reports and discusses the results 
of a probe study of complex sentences with adverbial clauses 
in which the language materials used were analyzed as a ran­
dom factor. The aims.! of the study are twofold: to investi­
gate two psycholingustic variables related to sentence 
interpretation; and to explicitly apply to that investigation 
some methodological aspects of experimental design and analy­
sis that are related to the problem of generality.
Before the joint aims of the present study can be 
coordinated, however, one needs to consider a bit of the 
background that underlies the separate areas of psycho­
linguistics and research methodology. This introduction is 
intended to provide such a background.
Part 1--Language and Psychology: A Necessary Merger
— presents an overview of the subfield of psycholinguistics. 
In particular, the dialectic relationship between theories 
of language and theories of mind is developed. A conse­
quence of this dialectic exchange is that viable theories of 
sentence interpretation must attend to both the linguistic 
structures and the perceptual strategies of a listener.
In part 2--Psycholinguisti.cs and the Experimental 
Method: The Problem of Generality--induction, as classically
characterized by Hume, is considered within the context of 
experimental research. In particular, the inductive leap
1
involved in applying one's research findings to subjects and 
materials not sampled is examined. Statistical and empirical 
approaches aimed at legitimizing that leap are critically 
reviewed.
Finally, in part 3--The Focus of the Present Study—  
critical points from theoretical psycholinguistics (part 1) 
and research methodology (part 2) are coordinated. The 
probe paradigm is selected as the tool for investigating 
linguistic structures and perceptual strategies involved in 
sentence interpretation. Further, the experiment is explic­
itly designed to include sufficient power for a stringent 
test of effects over subject and material populations.
Linguistics and Psychology: A Necessary Merger
Psychological interest in language is predicated on 
the obvious observation that humans engage in verbal dialogues. 
A speaker has something to say, and says it; a listener 
hears what was said, and understands it. The listener 
then becomes a speaker; the speaker a listener, etc. Yet, 
there is a striking temporal asymmetry in this predication. 
Verbal dialogues are as old as the human species, psycho­
logical interest in such dialogues, however, is a mid­
twentieth century phenomenon.^  The forces behind this recent
"^See Chapter 2 of Fodor, Bever, and Garrett (1974) 
for a brief account of psycholinguistics prior to 1960. The 
territoriality of both linguists and psychologists is 
obvious: both saw little to be gained from interdisiplinary
work. In the 1950's however, there was an overt attempt to 
combine work in taxonomic grammar with Hullean psychology. 
Although that specific merger was a failure, it did provide
3rapprochement involve a convergence of developments in 
psychology and linguistics.
The Mind as a Topic of Inquiry for
Psychologists and Linguists
During its brief history, experimental psychology
has cyclicly embraced the study of mind as central to the
discipline and rejected the mind as a construct necessarily
2
outside the realm of scientific inquiry. Over the last 
three decades the study of mind has once again been recog­
nized as a legitimate topic for psychological inquiry. But 
modern psychology is not merely an echo of earlier con­
ceptions. Rather, while acknowledging intellectual ancestors,
for an integrative framework. The goal of understanding how 
a speaker-listener makes use of the formal structures of a 
language continues to characterize psycholinguistics.
2Consider the following definitions of psychology:
In psychology, man looks at himself as it were from 
within, and ne tries to explain the connections among 
thoseprocesses which this internal observation pre­
sents to him. (Wundt, 1874, p. 1)
Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its 
phenomena and of their conditions. (James, 1890, Vs,
p. 1)
Behaviorism . . . holds that the subject matter of human 
psychology is the behavior of the human being. Behav­
iorism claims that consciousness is neither a definite 
nor a usuable concept. (Watson, 1930, p. 2)
Psychology is concerned with establishing relations 
between the behavior of an organism and the forces acting 
upon it. . . . If I can't give a clean-cut statement of a 
relationship between behavior and antecedent variables, 
it is no help to me to speculate about something inside 
the organism which will fill the gap. (Skinner, from 
Evans 1968, pp. 21, 22)
4theorists have aimed at producing explicit models to 
characterize the relationship between inner human forces and 
the outside world. The very title of the watershed book by 
Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960), Plans and the Structure 
of Behavior, suggests that psychologists ought to be con­
cerned with more than just the behavior that organisms 
exhibit. In their first chapter the authors acknowledge that, 
by stressing the connection between intentions and behavior, 
they are in some measure endorsing issues that concerned 
William James (1890) in his ideo-motor theory. Yet they 
accurately note that "the bridge James gives us between the 
idea and the motor is nothing but a hyphen" (p. 12). To 
explicate that "hyphen," Miller et al. propose a computer- 
based model (the TOTE) whose input is intentions and output 
is behavior. In 1967 Ulrich Neisser published a textbook for 
the field of cognitive psychology. In it he stated that 
because " . . .  the climate of opinion has changed," he 
needed no ". . . chapter of self-defense against the 
behaviorist position." Rather, " . . .  The basic reason for 
studying cognitive processes has become as clear as the 
reason for studying anything else: because they are there"
(p. 5).
A similar mentalistic revival has occurred in lin­
guistics. Based largely on the work of Noam Chomsky (1957,
1965), generative grammars have, for the most part, replaced 
structural grammars. These generative grammars are explicitly 
concerned with the underlying linguistic intuitions of
5humans rather than the classification of observable speech 
events. Language, generatively described, is seen as a 
uniquely human mental ability. The creative aspect of 
language--that humans routinely produce and understand novel 
utterances— is emphasized. Moreoever, in Chomsky's view, 
a consequence of embedding language in a mentalistic frame­
work is that the study of language becomes more than the 
study of isolated words or sentences:
. . . the study of language . . . will bring to light 
inherent properties of the human mind .. . . Contemporary 
work in grammar . . . attempts to formulate principles 
of organization of language which, it is proposed, are 
universal reflections of properties of mind . . . Viewed 
in this way, linguistics is simply a part of human psy­
chology: the field that seeks to determine the nature
of human mental capabilities and to study how these 
capacities are put to work (1972, p. 103).
Chomsky's definition of the field of psychology fits well
with the conceptions of Miller et al. and Neisser. In fact
both books include a chapter on Chomsky's generative grammar
and its relation to psychology.
Language: A Part of Cognitive Psychology
The logic of the bond between psychology and lin­
guistics seems to be this: grammar is concerned with those
mental abilities that are linguistic; the larger notion of 
mental abilities subsumes the notion of language abilities; 
thus, the study of mental abilities (cognitive psychology) 
naturally includes one of its most important constituents-- 
language (linguistics). Although this relationship is, in 
general, now obvious and compelling, the details of the 
psycholinguistic approach often need considerable explication.
6What, exactly, do nouns, verbs and dangling participles have 
to do with psychology? Recently, Fodor (1975) has addressed 
these issues in a work he describes as "unabashedly an 
essay in speculative psychology," in which he attempts to 
discover "how the mind works insofar as answers to that 
question emerge from recent empirical studies of language 
and cognition" (p. viii). He argues that there is a kind of 
logical hierarchy among natural languages, theories of 
communication, and theories of cognition; details from each 
preceding level provide empirical constraints on that which 
follows.
Consider the diagram in Figure 1. Using natural 
language a's a mediator, a message has been transferred from 
one person to another. This occurs because the utterance 
conforms to certain conventions of the language shared by 
both speaker and listener. Linguistic theory is connected 
with the theory of communication in that generative grammar 
seeks to explicitly describe conventions or descriptions that 
must be met by an utterance in order that it be considered 
part of a language. It is the grammar, then, that attempts 
to specify the correspondance between message and utterance. 
The grammar, that is, provides a structural description of 
each sentence, where "structural description" is defined as 
a finite set of descriptive levels at which sentences of the 
language are analyzed. These levels include the quite con- 
crete--those associated with the form of an utterance (e.g., 
phonetic representations)--and quite abstract levels--those
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Figure 1. Language as a medium for transmitting 
messages.
8related to the meaning of a message (e.g., deep structure 
representations).
Because the structural description of a sentence 
mediates the communication process, it is said to be "psy­
chologically real." It contains, that is, levels which must
3
be involved in processing natural sentences. It is 
important to note that psychological reality has no necessary 
relation to awareness. Suppose a speaker utters the word 
"hat." When I hear that word I intuitively and instanta­
neously understand that utterance to mean the yellow piece of 
cloth on my head. Thus, there must be some level within the 
structural description that represents the utterance as a 
reference expression. But what of those lower levels that 
are included in the structural description? One may wonder 
whether they are really necessary. Is it necessary, that is, 
in the case of "hat," to postulate a description at the 









It is obvious that the utterance "hat" may be described as a 
series of specific sounds. In fact, the proper utterance 
requires that a speaker meet certain phonetic demands. Yet, 
the details of the phonetic requirements are of little
See Fromkin and Rodman (1974) for a discussion of 
the psychological reality of distinctive features, phonemes, 
and syllables. Subsequent sections in the introduction 
examine the psychological reality of specific syntactic 
units.
9interest to either the speaker intending to convey some 
information or to the listener attending to the message. 
Suppose, however, that the message misses the phonetic mark, 
as in the following sequence:
+ consonantal + vocalic + consonantal
+ anterior + low + anterior
+ voice + tense + coronal
In this case, the reference is misinterpreted. Thus, 
although not intending to utter a sequence that satisfies 
certain phonetic requirements, a speaker must do so if 
referential messages are to be accurately transmitted. The 
lower concrete descriptions thus become the necessary means 
to the intended, abstract, referential end.
Expansion of an utterance into a phrase or a clause 
also requires the postulation of intermediate, syntactic 
levels of description. A speaker may not intend, for 
instance, to convey information about the tense of a verb, 
but unless the utterance includes such syntactic information, 
normal ease of communication will be interrupted. Consider 
the difference beteen the following sentences: 
la. It is a pleasure to write,
lb. It is a pleasure to have written.
At this moment I would deny the first message but heartily 
endorse the second. If I am to communicate these ideas to a 
listener, my utterances must satisfy certain syntactic require­
ments relevant to the tense of the verb. Moreover, the
10
listener must recognize that the utterances do so.
It is important to note that psychological reality 
is claimed for levels of a structural description but not 
necessarily for operations that connect the levels with each 
other.^ Thus, a grammar, bound by the constraints of 
natural language, is subsumed by a broader theory of communi­
cation. That theory, in turn, is bound by the constraints 
of messages and it is subsumed by a broader theory of cog­
nition. Messages are ideas— part of the mind— and the means 
by which they are represented is a mental process. Theories 
of mental processes, therefore, must account for the means by 
which messages are interpreted, and it is assumed that infor­
mation about linguistic abilities provides important bound­
aries for cognitive theories.
One of the things we can do with linguistic material 
is forget it. But the forgetting is not random and it is
In nearly everyone of his books, Chomsky has empha­
sized that a grammar is not intended to be a model of a 
speaker/hearer. The following quote is representative:
To avoid what has been a continuing misunderstanding, it 
is perhaps worth while to reiterate that a generative 
grammar is not a model for a speaker or a hearer. It 
attempts to characterize in the most neutral possible 
terms the knowledge of the language that provides the 
basis for actual use of language by a speaker-hearer. 
When we speak of a grammar as generating a sentence 
with a certain structural description, we mean simply 
that the grammar assigns this structural description 
to the sentence. When we say that a sentence has a cer­
tain derivation with respect to a particular generative 
grammar, we say nothing about how the speaker or 
hearer might proceed, in some practical or efficient 
way, to construct such a derivation. (1965, p. 9)
11
related to the abstract levels of the structural description
of the message. (I can11 remember many specific words or
sentences, but I remember reading last night that the Red
Sox lost to Mark Fidrych and the Tigers!) It is probable,
therefore, that the capacity to forget (selectively) is
5
related to the way in which information is stored. The 
following diagram (Figure 2) is meant to convey schematically 
the interdependence of the signal, grammar, and memory.
It is obvious that the study of language is relevant to the 
study of mind. Whatever else they may do, theories of 
cognition must account for the manner in which ordinary 
people utter and interpret natural language.
Cognition: A Part of the Psychology of Language
Thus far, the models of the speakers and listeners have
included only their linguistic knowledge. Bever (1970) 
has suggested that there is much more to the ordinary use
of language. He has argued for the "cognitive basis for
linguistic structures" (p. 279), suggesting that the relation­
ship between language and mind is dialectical: linguistic
information constrains cognitive theories and perceptual/ 
cognitive information constrains linguistic theories.^ Even
See Fodor et al. (1974), especially the section 
entitled "The coding hypothesis" (pp. 264-268).
^This is not to imply that Fodor (1975) neglects the 
language and mind dialectic. Support for the interplay is 
implicit throughout the book. Rather, the point is that 
Fodor emphasizes that linguistic information constrains 
cognitive theories; and-Bever emphasizes that cognitive infor­
mation constrains theories of language. The two together 
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the formal definition of language, in Bever's view, cannot
be isolated from other cognitive skills. Any attempt to
specify pure linguistic structure is therefore artificial
and problematic:
Certain ostensibly grammatical structures may develop 
out of other behavioral systems rather than being 
inherent in grammar. That is, linguistic structure 
is itself partially determined by the learning and 
behavioral processes that are involved in acquiring 
and implementing that structure (1970, p. 280).
Thus, a model of a speaker/listener must include not only 
intuitive linguistic knowledge (the domain of a grammar), but 
also a means for the implementation of that knowledge (the 
domain of perception/cognition).^  An examination of the 
psychological reality of linguistic structures must be inte­
grated with a consideration of the psychological reality of 
linguistic processes. One important goal of such an inte­
grated approach is to eliminate descriptions of processes 
that are "technically accurate but perceptually irrelevant" 
(Bever, 1973, p. 150).8
Fodor et al. (1974) suggest that this psycholin­
guist ic approach is a useful and prototypic psychological 
approach to non-linguistic areas as well:
. . . any serious account of the behavior of an organism 
will have to say not only how (i.e., by virtue of what 
psychological mechanisms) the organism puts its knowl­
edge to use, but also what it is that the organism 
knows; what concept it has (p. 5).
g
Bever used the quoted expression to describe a non- 
Gestalt or elemental approach to perception. I believe that 
by analogy the expression is also applicable to a non- 
perceptual approach to sentence interpretation.
The Unreality of a Purely Linguistic Account of
Sentence Interpretation. The initial phase of contemporary 
psycholinguistic inquiry was anything but integrated; the 
early work failed to heed Chomsky's warning that generative, 
transformational grammar is not a model of the way in which 
speakers and listeners produce and understand sentences (see 
footnote 4). Some psychologists, impressed with the apparent 
power and generality of his theory, sought to test the 
possibility that transformational complexity is isomorphic 
with perceptual complexity. Research on this hypothesis, 
the Derivational Theory of Complexity (DTC) constituted this 
first phase of post-Chomskian psycholinguistic inquiry. 
Sentence pairs exhibiting various syntactic constructions 
were examined. In each case, the application of at least 
one extra transformational rule was necessary to derive one 
pair member. The DTC always predicted that the sentence with 
the longer derivational history would be perceptually more 
complex. The comparison of active and passive sentences 
was prototypic; passives, it was predicted, would be harder 
to understand than actives. Although there was some initial 
empirical support for this position (Miller & McKeen, 1964), 
researchers soon found that the perceptual asymmetry between 
actives and passives holds only in special cases (Slobin,
1966). In particular, sentences were seen as falling into 
one of two categories--reversible and irreversible. A 
reversible sentence is one in which an equally plausible 
sentence would result if the subject and object phrases were
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interchanged. For example:
2a. The tall man saw the girl with curly hair.
2b. The girl with curly hair saw. the tall man.
2c. The girl with the curly hair was seen by the 
tall man.
2d. The tall man was seen by the girl with the 
curly hair.
In an irreversible sentence, an exchange of subject and 
object phrases results in an implausible sentence. For 
example:
3a. The tall man climbed the fence.
3b. The fence climbed the tall man.
3c. The fence was climbed by the tall man.
3d. The tall man was climbed by the fence.
In reversible sentences, passives are harder than their 
corresponding actives; in irreversible sentences, there is 
no difference between actives and passives. Thus, the 
perceptual difference between actives and passives cannot be 
due solely to transformational complexity because sentences 
which do not show this asymmetry are equally complex. One 
must postulate, it seems, a source of variability other than 
grammatical rules.
Presumably, in irreversible sentences, the intended 
message can be inferred directly from the words of the 
sentence, thus rendering syntactic processing superfluous.
In reversible sentences, however, the information provided 
by the words is ambiguous; an analysis of the syntactic
16
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features of the sentences is necessary. It is obvious, 
therefore, that predictions based on the DTC are not uni­
formly confirmed. The passive transformation provides at 
least one r portant exception; in it, some non-syntactic, 
heuristic procedure must be involved. A number of studies 
(Fodor & Garrett, 1966; Bever, 1970; and Fodor et al., 1974) 
have found the DTC inadequate in many other respects. They 
have concluded that whatever the relationship between 
grammatical complexity and perceptual complexity, it is not 
as direct as the DTC predicts."^
In retrospect, the failure of the DTC is not sur­
prising. Generative grammar was not intended to be a model 
of the speaker/listener; it is an explicit description of 
the nature of linguistic structure. Further, the DTC pre­
dicted many events which simply are counter to common sense 
and experience.^ It must predict, for example, that 4a is
9
Even with reversible actives and passives, it is 
dubious that it is the passive transformation per se that 
is responsible for the added complexity. Limber (1977) points 
out that the "by" in the passive sentence is potentially 
ambiguous. "By" may indicate either a passive or a locative 
construction.
■^History seems to be repeating itself. Within 
semantics, researchers are investigating the relationship 
between the surface vocabulary of a language and the semantic 
representation that the grammar would supply. Fodor (1975) 
reports: "the predicted correspondence between definitional
and perceptual complexity does not seem to hold" (p. 147).
■^Some of the empirical inadequacies of the DTC 
have just been described. Limber (1976) considers the 
logical inadequacies of DTC.
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perceptually more complex than 4b, and that 5a and 5b do 
not differ in perceptual complexity:
4a. Your gold medallion has a lovely inscription 
on it.
4b. Your medallion which is gold has a lovely 
inscription on it.
5a. The man the woman the mother liked loved walked.
5b. The race the man the reporter interviewed 
planned was postponed.
Moreover, the grammar of a language (as conceived 
by Chomsky, 1947, 1965) is, by design, not equipped to 
comment on two common linguistic events. (1) The grammar 
generates some sentences that are perfectly grammatical yet 
completely uninterpretable by native speakers of the language. 
Consider, for example, a sentence like 5a but with thirteen 
embeddings. Formal restrictions in the grammar do not set 
an upper limit on the number of embeddings per sentence.
(2) Certain lexical strings not generated by the grammar are 
interpretable by native speakers of the language. An example 
of such a string appears in 6.
6*. The man tall he had on yellow shoes.
Sentences may thus be classified in the following way: 
grammatical-ungrammatical, acceptable-unacceptable and 
interpretable-uninterpretable. These dimensions are at least 
partially independent of one another. The grammar may deter­
mine that which a listener extracts from an utterance, but 
it cannot provide a description of the manner in which the
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listener obtains such information. Any comprehensive theory 
of sentence processing must, therefore, address itself to 
both grammatical structure and psychological processes— it 
must be truly psycholinguistical.
Perceptual Strategies arid Sentence Interpretation. 
Bever (1970), Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974) and Limber 
(1976) argue for a broad theory of sentence interpretation 
that considers the interaction of cognitive systems with 
linguistic information. Sometimes the interactive nature of 
these variables permits a listener to use non-linguistic 
information to solve an essentially linguistic problem— as 
in the clarification of some ambiguous sentences. At other 
times, input from cognitive systems may reduce the importance 
of syntactical analyses— as with irreversible passive 
sentences (see sentence 3c).
It is obvious that in many instances, cognitive and 
linguistic information are not easily distinguishable. 
Irreversible passive sentences are understood as easily as 
their corresponding active sentences because semantic proper­
ties of the lexical items limit the plausible actor-action- 
object relationships into which those words can enter. That 
is, with respect to sentence 3c, "climbing" is something that 
a man does to a fence, and not vice versa. A critical 
question is this: are semantic constraints (such as repre­
sented in 3c) examples of the dominance of linguistic infor­
mation provided by the-grammar? Or, conversely, are they
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examples of pragmatic information that reflects something 
about objects and actions in the world? One may assume that 
pragmatics are alwaysinvolved--sentence interpretation occurs, 
in most instances, in the real world of objects and actions. 
But one must also consider the extent to which a grammar can 
be explicit about a listener's expectancies. For example, 
the lexicon entry for the verb "climb" might include a 
description which specifies the requirement of an inanimate 
object. In this case, the grammar would be isomorphic with 
the expectations of the listener and it would therefore 
disallow sentences 3b and 3d. But now let us consider 
sentences that contain non-syntactic implausibilities. For 
example:
7a. The mosquito bit the woman.
7b. The woman bit the mosquito.
As 7b describes a statistically infrequent act, 7a would be 
labeled irreversible. The grounds for irreversibility are 
clearly pragmatic; 7b violates an expectation (one may 
assume) rather than a formal property described by the 
grammar.
Any comprehensive theory of sentence interpretation,
we have seen, must allow a place for linguistic structure and
for memory--for one's understanding and prediction of worldy
events. The latter are commonly incorporated into the theory 
12as heuristics. A heuristic is a rule of probability based
12Bever (1970> uses the phrase "behavioral induction," 
and admits that the source of the induction (linguistic or
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on the expectation that sentences will follow the same 
characteristic patterns which described them in the past; 
that is, certain grammatical features are weighted more 
heavily than others. Since a grammar contains no weighting 
procedure, the assignment of probabilities must be accounted 
for by a model of sentence perception. Heuristic procedures 
discussed by Bever (1970) and Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974) 
are associated with three aspects of sentence interpretation: 
clausal analysis, lexical analysis, and surface structure 
analysis.
Clausal Analysis: The understanding of an utterance
implies that the acoustic signal has been segmented into
13chunks which correspond to deep structure sentoids. A 
native speaker can easily delineate the three segments of the 
following utterance:
8. you are teaching a class I am writing in the 
library it is hot outside today.
Grammatical knowledge underlies the segmentation—  
the task could not be performed (at least by me) with a Ger­
man utterance. The grammar, however, specifies many levels 
of linguistic segmentation--phonetic, words, phrases, as well
experimental) is not obvious. In this regard, consider the 
following remark from C. S. Pierce, as quoted in Chomsky 
(1972, p. 91):
induction has no originality in it, but only tests a 
suggestion already made.
13A sentoid is like a clause. Technically, it is 
a phrase structure tree that is immediately dominated by a 
S node.
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as clauses. None of these levels is necessarily dominant.
Yet experimental and anecdotal evidence indicates that there 
is a perceptual strategy for segmenting utterances into 
clauses. This strategy, or heuristic, applies to a dis­
course which contains a number of sentences with only a 
single clause (as in sentence 8), and to sentences that con­
tain more than one clause.
Using the "click" paradigm developed by Ladefoged 
and Broadbent (1960), Garret, Bever and Fodor (1966) were 
able to show that the processing of a sentence requires that 
listeners be sensitive to the clausal structure even when 
the natural prosodic features of the utterance are suppressed. 
Pairs of sentences with common lexical items but different 
clause boundaries were constructed:
9a. (In her hope of marrying) Anna was surely 
impractical.
9b. (Your hope of marrying Anna) was surely 
impractical.
The common items were cross-recorded so that the acoustic 
properties of the sentence pairs was identical. An instan­
taneous burst of noise (a "click") was then placed within 
the word "Anna." The listener's task was to indicate the 
location of the click. The rationale is this: if the clause
is a psychologically real perceptual unit, then it should be 
processed as a whole and resist the interruption of the click. 
Results support this prediction: listener's receiving
sentence 9a prepose the click into the clause boundary between
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"marrying" and "Anna," while listener's receiving 9b postpose 
the click into the clause boundary between "Anna" and "was." 
Since both groups of listeners heard an identical recording, 
their differential performance must be due to some more ab­
stract dimension along which the sentences differ. The 
sentences have different clause boundaries and it is likely 
that, at some level, the listeners know this. Studies such 
as these suggest that the clause as a structural description 
is psychologically real. It may be concluded therefore that 
listeners engage in some sort of clausal grouping.
The "click" studies, important and striking though 
they are, shed no light on the process that underlies clausal 
analysis.^ Bever (1970) has suggested that the segmentation 
of clauses is accomplished by the following heuristic:
Segment together any sequence X . . . Y, in which the 
A members could be related by primary internal structural
relations, "actor action object . . . modifier (p. 290).
Various applications of this strategy might account for the 
segmentation of a single clause sentence or a sentence with 
more than one clause. Fodor et al. (1974) refer to this 
strategy as the "canonical-sentoid" strategy. It is simply 
true that a surface ordering of noun phrase, verb, optional 
noun phrase usually corresponds to subject, verb, and optional 
object of deep structure which, in turn, corresponds to 
actor, action, and optional object of the message. Thus, it
^Garrett, Bever and Fodor (1966) has been presented as 
a prototypic click study. For a more extensive review of 
research using the click paradigm, see Fodor et al. (1974), 
pp. 329-341.
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seems plausible simply on rational grounds that the canonical 
hypothesis is valid. Moreover, Bever (1968) found that if 
a canonical trap was set for listeners, their errors, made 
when paraphrasing a sentence, could be made predictable and 
more numerous. Specifically, he compared performance on 
sentence pairs like 10a and 10b.
10a. The editor the authors the newspapers hired 
liked died.
10b. The editor authors the newspaper hired liked 
died.
Both sentences have the following syntactic arrangement:
NP NP NP VP VP VP
In 10b, however, the NP "authors" is lexically ambiguous. It 
could be a plural noun or it could be a third-person singular, 
present tense verb. Thus, if the sentence is processed 
sequentially from beginning to end, at least through the 
middle of sentence 10b, a listener has two syntactic descrip­
tions of the sentence:
NP NP NP . . .
NP VP NP .
The second one conforms to the canonical strategy and should 
be preferred. Once the last part of the sentence is heard, 
the canonical hypothesis becomes untenable, and only the 
NP NP NP description makes any sense. The point is not simply
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that 10b is perceptually more complex than 10a. The dif­
ference in perceptual complexity can easily be accounted for 
by the lexical ambiguity of the phrase "authors" in 10b.
More importantly, the ambiguity allows the listener to employ 
the canonical strategy. In addition, that strategy, once 
used, tends to persist. Listeners mistakenly paraphrase the 
utterance as though "the editor authors the newspapers" is 
a complete sentoid, even though this interpretation renders 
the remainder of the sentence nonsensical. Its resistance 
to correction indicates that the strategy is fixed firmly in 
a listener's repetoire of techniques used in the interpreta­
tion of sentences.
Of course, the canonical hypothesis is not the only 
heuristic used; noncanonical sentences are understood. More­
over, as Fodor, Bever and Garrett (1974) point out, listeners 
do not always fall into canonical traps. The following 
sentences appear to be approximately equal in complexity:
11a. They wanted John killed, 
lib. They wanted John dead.^
Yet for one sentence the canonical strategy yields a correct 
description of subject-verb relations while for the other 
sentence it does not. If the strategy is applied twice to 
11a, the following subject-verb sequences emerge: (they
wanted), (John killed). But John is the object rather than 
the subject of "killed." In lib "dead" is not interpreted as
15These sentences are from Fodor et al. (1974),
p. 348.
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a verb phase, thus "John" is not misinterpreted as the pre­
ceding subject NP. A heuristic, then, does not work every time 
but it works often enough to be useful. A model of sentence 
interpretation must, therefore, specify the structural organi­
zation on which a heuristic operates and it must describe 
procedures for handling exceptions."^
Lexical Analysis: A clausal analysis partitions a
sentence into units of a message or proposition. The internal, 
structural relationship among the elements of each unit must 
then be determined. In some cases, a knowledge of word mean­
ings and judgments of plausibility combine to produce correct 
inferences about the grammatical relationships within a 
clause. For example, the words "man," "climbed," and "fence" 
are internally related as actor-action-object. The relation­
ship is easily inferred on semantic grounds for both the active 
and passive forms (sentences 3a and 3c). For the case of 
irreversible sentences, Bever (1970) suggests "that the
presence of unique semantic constraints allows syntactic
17factors to be bypassed entirely" (p. 296). Bever further 
speculates that reliance on heuristics is probably much 
greater in natural conversations than it is with isolated 
sentences in a laboratory setting; natural conversations pro­
vide contextual information and knowledge about the speaker,
"^See Limber (1977) for an example of heuristics that 
operated on relative clauses.
17Bever (1970) also points out that semantic constraints 
can ease the understanding of some center-embedded sentences. 
Sentences 5a and 5b (p. 17 of this introduction) illustrate 
this point.
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etc. which is unavailable in the controlled laboratory.
We may wish to conclude from Bever's analysis that, 
for certain sentences in certain situations, the interpreta­
tion of a message occurs without any kind of syntactic 
18analysis. Yet Bever cannot be quite right. Consider the 
following utterances from which a listener obviously receives 
an identical message:
12a. The man climbed the fence.
12b. The fence was climbed by the man.
12c. man . . . climbed . . . fence 
The listener also, and just as obviously, knows there is a 
difference in form between these sentences. 12a and 12b are 
well-formed sentences while 12c is not. Moreover, 12a and 
12b contain syntactic noise which is not present in 12c; one 
might guess, therefore, that the non-noise condition is the 
preferred form. Yet most individuals do not speak in tele- 
grammese; there is no reason to suppose they understand in 
telegrammese either. We might tentatively conclude, there­
fore, that the interpretation of an utterance always involves
a device or process which monitors the syntactic correctness 
19of an utterance.
18Bever is quite clear on this point: "Thus, most
normal perceptual processing of sentences is probably carried 
out with little regard to actual sequence or structure"
(1970, p. 297).
19Even if Bever's point is legitimate, that a syn­
tactic component need not be postulated to explain the per­
ception of some utterances, there is still the necessity of 
including such a component in a production model. But pre­
sumably, production-model components are present to facilitate 
perception.
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A lexicon contains more than just the dictionary mean­
ings of words. It also includes the syntactic features of
each word--a list of the kinds of constructions in which that
20word can appropriately appear. For verbs, this includes 
information about the range of possible noun phrases that 
verbs can take as objects. Consider the following verbs: 
contain and require. Both verbs are transitive; they take 
nouns as direct objects, as in 13 and 14:
13. Your paper contains many interesting ideas.
14. My body requires food.
"Require," but not "contain," can also take a compliment 
construction as an object, as in 15:
15. The instructor required students to write 
intelligible English sentences.
In this case, the object NP is not just a noun; it is a 
clause in which [students-write-sentences] form a jsubject- 
verb-object] relationship. We may summarize as follows:
16a. Subject verb (contain) direct object 
16b. Subject verb (require) ^ — direct object
^clause
"Contain" provides explicit structural information about what 
is to follow; "require" provided ambiguous information.
What is the effect of lexical differences on the 
processing of sentences? Fodor, Garrett and Bever (1968) 
found that sentences with complex verbs (i.e., verbs that
90
See J. J. Katz "The Realm of Meaning" in G. A.
Miller (ed.), Communication, language and meaning, for an 
introduction to the use of syntactic and semantic features in 
a lexiom.
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allow more than one type of grammatical construction) are per­
ceptually more difficult than identical sentences with 
simpler verbs. For instance, 17a which follows is more often 
erroneously paraphrased than 17b. In addition, when subjects 
were asked to arrange grammatically words which were pre­
sented in random order, they more often failed and started 
falsely with a-type sentences.
17a. The old theory obviously required several false 
assumptions about cosmology.
17b. The old theory obviously contained several 
false assumptions about cosmology.
Note that both sentences have identical syntactic structure. 
The complex verb, although capable of taking a complement, 
does not. Yet for most of Fodor, et al.'s sentences, the 
initial part of the sentence does not exclude the possibility 
that a complement will follow the verb, as it does in 17c:
17c. The old theory required that somewhere there 
should be peanuts without shells.
It is not so much the complexity of the verb, per se, there­
fore, that increases the perceptual load; rather, the lack 
of cues early in a sentence inhibits a listener's capacity 
to anticipate the proper construction. Indeed, once a complex 
verb has been identified (or any lexical item that is compati­
ble with more than one construction) by a listener, one may 
reasonably ask how that person ever arrives at a correct 
analysis of the sentence. Surface structure cues can be 
very helpful here.
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Surface Structure Analysis: A listener's task is
to derive a message from an uttered speech signal. The 
utterance must be segmented into clauses, structural rela­
tions must be assigned to elements in each clause and, in 
complex sentences, the relationship between the clauses must 
be considered. Information necessary to perform these tasks 
must be present in the surface structure and the listener 
must be able to extract and use that information. Surface 
structure cues may be relatively obvious or subtle; as they 
become more obvious they render a sentence less difficult 
perceptually.
A verb can be used in a variety of deep structure 
constructions. How, then, is a listener to know which con­
struction is appropriate for the analysis of any particular 
sentence? Recall that the verb "require" can take either a 
direct object or complement objects (to- of that- comple­
ments). In sentence 18a which follows, the word "to" clearly 
marks the infinitival construction:
18a. The instructor required the students to work. 
Similarly, in 17c, the word "that" signaled a complement 
construction. Note, however, that in 17c "that" could be 
deleted from the sentence. Thus, it ought not be the only 
surface-structure cue signaling the complement clause. Com­
pare 17c (with the word "that" deleted) with 17a. For the 
simple direct-object construction (17a), there is no verb 
following the complex verb "require"; but in 17c an additional 
verb signals another cluase, and hence another construction.
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Compare the two versions of 17c (with and without the pro­
noun, "that"). Both sentences contain surface-structure cues 
which indicate that the sentence has two clauses. One 
sentence has two cues, and the additional cue (the "that") 
occurs at the beginning of the second clause. A theory of 
sentence interpretation which stresses importance of sur­
face -structure cues would predict that deleting the pronoun 
"that" from the sentence should increase the perceptual 
complexity of the sentence. Fodor and Garrett (1967) con­
structed pairs of center-embedded sentences in which the 
relative pronouns either were or were not deleted (as in 19a, 
19b) .
19a. The window which the ball that the boy threw 
hit broke.
19b. The window the ball the boy threw hit broke.
They found that the presence of the relative pronouns 
facilitated the speed and accuracy with which subjects para­
phrased the sentences. They also compared two versions of 
19b— one version read in a monotone, the other read with 
normal intonation. They found that the intonation (another 
surface-structure cue) facilitated the comprehension of a 
sentence, although its effect was inferior to that of relative 
pronouns in a sentence without normal intonation.
Relative pronouns are powerful surface-structure cues 
which signal the presence of an additional clause. They also 
yield information about the relation between or among the 
clauses in a sentence. Specifically, relative pronouns
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introduce subordinate clauses; i.e., those clauses which are 
always embedded within a main clause. The main clause con­
veys the primary content of the propositon; the subordinate 
clause adds supplementary information about the primary con­
tent. Subordinate clauses can also be introduced by adverbs, 
such as:
20a. Before their nine-game losing streak, the Red 
Sox were in first place.
20b. After we saw "Fiddler on the Roof," we began 
reading World of Our Fathers.
In these sentences, the initial adverb clearly marks the 
subordinate-main structure. Notice that 20a and 20b could 
be reversed, making the clause order main-subordinate.
20c. The Red Sox were in first place, before their 
nine-game losing streak.
20d. We began reading World of Our Fathers, after 
we saw "Fiddler on the Roof."
In these cases, if the only heuristic a listener uses is to 
look for the presence of an adverb or a relative pronoun that 
introduces the subordinate clause, then for 20c and 20d no 
decision about the sentence can be made until the mid-point 
of the sentence.
A heuristic has been suggested by Fodor, et al.
(1974) which determines the relation between clauses in a 
sentence, and which account for the cases illustrated in 
20a-d:
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Take the verb which immediately follows the initial noun 
B of a sentence as the main verb unless there is a surface 
structure mark of an embedding (p. 356)21
This heuristic is a reflection of both perceptual and lin­
guistic factors. Weksel and Bever (1966) found that for 
various kinds of complex sentences, main-subordinate orderings 
(as in 20c and 20d) are preferred over subordinate-main 
orderings (as in 20a and 20b). Clark and Clark (1968) found 
that subordinate-main versions were harder to memorize than 
main-subordinate versions. A listener’s working assumption 
seems to be that the main clause will be presented first, 
while the subordinate one will come later. If this order is 
to be violated it must be clearly marked. The syntactic 
rules of English reflect this working hypothesis:
A subordinate clause is marked as subordinate by the end 
of its verb phrase if it is the first clause in a 
sentence, but may go unmarked if it follows the main 
verb (Fodor, et al., 1974, p. 358).22
That is, the grammar will block the deletion of words that 
introduce a subordinate clause if that clause is the first 
clause of the sentence and if, without that introductory 
marker, the subordinate clause could be mistaken for the main 
clause. But the deletion will be permitted if the sub­
ordinate clause follows the main clause. Thus, in sentences
21Bever (1970) presents a similar heuristic: "The
first N . . . V . . . (N) . . . clause . . .  is the main 
clause, unless the verb is marked as subordinate" (p. 294).
22Bever (1970) argues that this syntactic rule is a 
consequence of the perceptual strategy presented in heuristic 
B. Determining such temporal order is at least problematic: 
a chicken versus the egg dilemma.
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21a and 21b where the first verb is the main verb, the word 
"that" is optional; but, in sentences 21c and 21d where the 
subordinate verb is first, the "that" must remain in the 
sentence to mark the subordination. Sentence 21d, which would 
present a problem for heuristic B, is not allowed by the 
grammar.
21a. Two Red Sox fans in Michigan believed that Boston 
could still win the division title.
21b. Two Red Sox fans in Michigan believed Boston 
could still win the division title.
21c. That Boston could still win the division title 
was believed by two Red Sox fans in Michigan.
*21d. Boston could still win the division title was 
believed by two Red Sox fans in Michigan.
To summarize, theories of sentence interpretation have 
advanced quite a bit from the early suggestion that when 
listeners understand a sentence they are performing computa­
tions analogous to the transformational operations that 
mediate surface and deep structures of a sentence. Rather, 
the distinction between grammaticality and acceptability has 
emphasized that at least part of what the grammar generates 
is beyond the interpretative ability of a listener. Per­
ceptual and cognitive limitations need to be an integral part 
of the model. Information from past experience, both lin­
guistic and nonlinguistic, needs to be incorporated into the 
model so that the listener can draw from those sources and 
make inferences about new linguistic material. Early
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psycholinguistic work stressed the importance of the grammar 
primarily because the contribution of grammar had been pre­
viously ignored. Contemporary psycholinguistic work stresses 
the non-exclusivity of the grammar in a broader theory of 
communication. Heuristics that deal with clausal, lexical, 
and surface-structure analyses draw on grammatical and 
inferential information that the listener has and are readily 
used in contemporary sentence-recognition models.
Psycholinguistics and the Experimental Method:
The Problem of Generality
Ordinarily, any particular piece of research is of 
interest because it is embedded in some theory. That is, a 
theory generates some specific predictions about a general 
class of events, and a research design is constructed to test 
the predictions over a subset of those events. Experimental 
results then either support or refute the theory. A vast 
body of literature on experimental methodology suggests, 
however, that the presumed direct and automatic link between 
experimental results and theoretical conclusions is often 
tenuous (Meehl, 1967).
One recurrent theme deals with the issues of gen- 
eralizability. To what extent can experimental findings from 
a relatively small sample reflect relationships in a larger 
population? The problem centers around the issue of inductive 
inference, predicting unobserved relationships from knowledge
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23about observed relationships. Since such predictions 
necessarily involve extrapolation beyond actual experimental 
findings, they would seem to require some kind of justifica­
tion.
Statistical Solutions?
Within experimental psychology, the justification 
has often taken the form of reliance upon statistical pro­
cedures embedded within the design model. In fact, in 
designing analysis of variance procedures, Fisher explicitly 
aimed at making induction automatic:
That such a process induction existed and was possible 
to normal minds, has been understood for centuries; 
it is only with the recent development of statistical 
science that an analytic account can now be given (1955, 
p. 74).
The analysis of variance is based on the assumption 
that any experiment is simply one sample from a hypothetical 
population of experiments. Statistical procedures are then
23Hume examines the problem of induction more closely, 
and concludes that even among observable events, the state­
ment of a cause and effect relationship involves a mental 
construction.
When any natural object or event is presented, it is 
impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to dis­
cover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event 
will result from it . . . Even after one instance or 
experiment where we have observed a particular event to 
follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general 
rule; . . .  it being . . .  an unpardonable temerity to 
judge of the whole course of nature from one single exper­
iment, however accurate or certain. But when one particu­
lar species of event has always, in all instances, been 
conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of 
fortelling one upon the appearance of the other . . .  We 
then call the one object, Cause; the other, Effect. We 
suppose that there is some connection between them . . . 
this connection . . .  we feel in the mind (II, vii).
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used to estimate the extent to which that actual experiment 
is representative of other experiments in the population.
Thus, if one meets the assumptions of the model, one is 
reasonably sure about not only the cause and effect relation­
ships in the experiment, but also about the likelihood of 
future replications.
The central assumption in Fisher's model, and the one 
that most researchers are keenly aware of, is that of a 
randomly sampled subject pool. If subjects are randomly 
selected and assigned to experimental groups, then one can be 
confident of two things: 1) that the sample and the popula­
tion differ mainly in size, and so, a description of one is a 
description of the other, and 2) that the various treatment 
groups are relatively equal before any treatment has been 
introduced. Then, by treating subjects as a random variable, 
one minimizes the extent to which the results are dependent 
on the particular subjects used. One is legitimately (if not 
logically) able to generalize the results to a wider range of 
people than were tested.
Typically, only subjects are deliberately sampled and 
analyzed as a random variable. Yet obviously the researcher 
wishes to generalize across more than just the subject pool. 
Variables that are thought to be theoretically irrelevant 
(such as the time, date, and location of the experiment, as 
well as the experimenter) are assumed to be randomly dis­
tributed throughout the population of experiments, and as such
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do not critically affect the results.^ Theoretically rele­
vant variables that are sampled (i.e., the independent 
variables) are usually analyzed as fixed variables. That 
is, they are a fixed part of both the actual experiment and 
all experiments in the hypothetical population of experi­
ments. Thus, when results are obtained, the model predicts 
that those fixed effects will remain stable in spite of 
changes in any of the random variables.
Clark (1973, 1976) has argued that in psycholinguistic
research, a second random variable ought to be routinely added
25to the analysis of variance model. Language materials and 
stimulus materials throughout experimental psychology are 
selected from a large (perhaps infinite) population and 
researchers typically discuss results as if the effects are 
constant across a set of materials larger than those sampled. 
Thus, the materials variable would seem conceptually like the 
subjects variable and so should be similarly analyzed. Other­
wise, the inductive leap to materials has no statistical 
legitimacy. Clark proposes an alternative analysis-- 
essentially selecting a more appropriate denominator for the
24For an alternative account of the role of an experi­
menter, see McGuigan (1963).
^Actually, Clark (1973) is, at least in part, reit­
erating a methodological issue raised earlier by Coleman 
(1964). But, although both papers are contentually similar, 
Coleman's paper scarcely caused a ripple while Clark's paper 
has stirred up quite a storm. It is Clark's paper that is 
referred to by both proponents and opponents in the language- 
as-fixed-factor controversy. This is due to innovative and 
controversial statistical procedures that Clark has proposed; 
in part, perhaps also, to Clark's position on the editorial 
board of the Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior.
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F ratio used to test for treatment effects. By advocating a 
statistical remedy for the conceptual and philosophical 
problem of induction, Clark is echoing Fisher's own belief 
that the strict adherence to the analysis-of-variance model 
will result in' " . . .  perfectly rigorous and unequivocal 
inference" (1960, p. 4).^
If the idea behind Clark's suggestion is rather sim­
ple (i.e., substituting one MS for another), the implementa­
tion of that suggestion is quite complicated. When a design 
has two separate random factors (as would be necessary to 
simultaneously generalize across subjects and materials), 
there is no single MS that can be used to appropriately 
evaluate the treatment effect unless the two were perfectly 
confounded. Winer (1971) suggests the use of a quasi F test 
(F') where the appropriate MS is estimated by pooling avail­
able MS's. But this design assumes a complete data matrix 
(that there is an entry for each subject-language item 
combination). As Clark points out, studies using a reaction 
time measure as the dependent variable often have a number of 
missing data cells. In these cases, F' can be approximated 
in a relatively straightforward manner by computing min F'. 
Min F' is based on the results of two simpler analyses. The 
traditional analysis with subjects as the sampling variable 
(and materials as a fixed factor) yields an F^; a similar
26Bakan (1966) questions the appropriateness of 
relying on a statistical test as a means for making an 
inductive inference. Though his remarks were directed against 
Fisher, they are similarly applicable to Clark.
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analysis with materials as the sampling variable (and sub­
jects as a fixed factor) yields £2 . A significant F-^ 
implies that the effect ought to be replicable with different 
subjects but the same materials; a significant F^, predicts 
replicability when the materials are changed but the same sub­
jects are used. Clark presents a formula for combining F^
and Fj2 to produce min F' which predicts replicability when
27both new subjects and new materials are used.
Correcting the "fixed-effect fallacy" however is not 
as simple as Clark implies. Past research cannot merely be 
reanalyzed. F^ and F^ can be combined to produce an inter­
pretable min F' only if the power of each analysis is 
roughly similar. It is very likely that pre-Clark studies 
in which only an F^ data analysis was intended will have a 
sufficiently powerful F^ but a much less powerful F^. In 
such cases, the insignificant min F' is at least as likely 
to result from the lack of power in the materials design as 
from the inability of the effect to generalize.
The inclusion of a min F' analysis is something that 
should precede rather than follow the choice of a design. 
Clark is obviously aware of this where future research is 
concerned: "The most important rule to keep in mind . . .  is
this: An experimental design is only as sensitive as the
less sensitive of the two subdesigns it contains" (1973, 
p. 349). Yet, in seeming self contradiction, he reanalyzes
27See Clark (1973) page 356 for an explication of 
the derivation of the formula for min F'. See the Results and 
Discussion sections for an example of the use of min F'.
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some past research and concludes that the insignificant min F 1
is evidence that the effect will not generalize to other
28language materials. By including case studies in which 
re-analyzed results are universally nonsignificant, Clark 
gives the unfortunate impression that both the quasi F and 
the min F' tests are extraordinarily conservative. He 
extravagently claims that "almost everyone" is committing 
the "fixed-effect fallacy" thereby implying that almost every 
study is a target for re-analysis and probably insignifi­
cant. Yet he fails to note that the insignificance which is 
indeed likely, is probably a function of the inappropriate 
nature of the re-analysis and so not really very informative 
about the nature of the effect. In this case, an insignifi­
cant min F' is like an insignificant F^ that describes a 
study that used only four subjects.
The min F' analysis is surely a more stringent test 
than just an F p  but there is no reason to believe that it 
is as intimidating as Clark's re-analyses would suggest. 
Forster and Dickenson (1976) used a Monte Carlo technique to 
compare Type I error rates for F p  F^, F 1 and min F' analyses 
when both subject and material variances were manipulated. 
Their results, which are summarized in multistage decision 
rules, suggest that under some conditions F' and min F 1 are
^ I n  fact, Clark (1973, p. 349) points out that for 
one study that he re-analyzed, with 56 subjects and 8 
materials, it is the much smaller F2 that places an upper 
bound on the F'. But he does not conclude that therefore 
his re-analysis is inappropriate.
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overly conservative but, for other conditions, F' and min F' 
are to be preferred over either F^ or F^ or both.
Empirical Solutions?
Wike and Church (1976) dispute the utility of F' 
and min F' arguing that they are only approximate F tests 
and that as such, statistical information about their 
properties is quite limited. Most investigations into the 
goodness of fit of the quasi-F approximations deal with con­
ditions of independent observations. Thus, there is virtually 
no information about quasi-F's involving repeated measures 
which are very common in psycholinguistic research. Wike 
and Church conclude that, although a major aim of research 
is generality, Clark's statistical prescriptions for achiev­
ing generality are "unsound." The problems of induction 
cannot be solved by simply inserting random factors where 
fixed factors used to be. Rather, they "suggest that investi­
gators continue using fixed factor designs about which more 
is known and seek nonstatistical generality by means of 
various modes of replication" (p. 254).
. . .  An investigator can replicate his findings with the 
same subjects and materials. He can replicate with new 
subjects or materials or both. Other investigators can 
replicate with different subjects and the same or 
different materials. Replication can also assume the 
form of what Lykken (1968) terms 'constructive replica­
tion' in which the reliability of an empirical fact is 
put to a test. Or by 'systematic replication' (Sidman, 
1960) in which an investigator deliberately departs from 
the conditions of a previous experiment . . .  in order 
to assess the generality of a relationship as well as 
its dependability (p. 254).
This empirical approach removes the burden of induc­
tion from the test of significance, and distributes the 
responsibility throughout the research community. The 
generality of an effect, then, is inferred by examing its 
stability and its lack of stability over the variable con­
ditions of replication. This position seems to be a con­
crete realization of Popper's (1962) conception of the manner 
in which scientific progress is attained: bold conjectures
are offered to a scientific community for refutation. But, 
within the realm of psychological experimentation and statis­
tical analyses, what is the means of refutation? The analysis 
of variance model gives the researcher two ways of describing 
results: the null hypothesis was rejected, and one may draw
some conclusions about the difference between the treatment 
groups; or 2) the null hypothesis was not rejected, and no 
conclusions are warranted regarding the equality or inequality 
of the treatment groups. The possibility of accepting the 
null hypothesis is, strickly speaking, not an option within 
the model because of the inability to distinguish between the 
actual equality of groups and the apparent equality of groups 
due to measurement error. By stepping outside the model and 
comparing the power of various experiments, a researcher may 
indeed be relatively sure that the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis represents a lack of an effect rather than a lack 
of power. But. then there is the added problem of publi­
cizing that information. Greenwald (1975) cogently describes 
the editorial prejudice encountered when trying to publish
null results.
A purely empirical solution to the problem of induc­
tion is clearly inadequate. In addition to the statistical 
problems involved in accepting null results, and the prag­
matic problems involved in publishing null results, there 
is also the theoretical problem of acknowledging and inter­
preting null results. A well-know "attempt-to-replicate" 
will be briefly examined in order to demonstrate the futility 
of replication if that replication is not embedded within an 
explicit theoretical framework.
Rosenthal (e.g., 1966) has held that the Experimenter 
Bias Effect--the tendency of experimenters to unwittingly 
twist their results in the direction of their predictions-- 
is pervasive and varied. He has, he claims, produced the 
phenomenon in dozens of published studies, with arenas as 
diverse as rat laboratories and classrooms. Rosenthal has 
held, moreover, that a great many experiments, including a 
number of very seminal studies, may be invalid.
A number of psychologists take issue with Rosenthal's 
findings and conclusions. Chief among these is Barber who 
has sought to demonstrate that the Experimenter Bias Effect 
cannot be replicated and hence does not exist (Barber, et al., 
1969). In "five attempts to replicate the Experimenter 
Bias Effect," in which nearly all the suggestions of Wike 
and Church were employed, Barber and his associates could 
replicate Rosenthal's results in none of them. Rosenthal, in 
a rejoinder, denied that his experimental conditions had been
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replicated by Barber; and he also claimed that, if Barber had 
used other statistical tests, he too would have "observed" 
the Experimenter Bias Effect in his own laboratory. Barber, 
in turn, commented on the problem associated with "post­
mortem analyses." In short, Barber followed the procedure 
recommended by Wike and Church not one but five times (a 
point emphasized by Barber) , and yet Rosenthal's conclusions 
regarding the Experimenter Bias Effect remained unchanged.
The exchange between Rosenthal and Barber might con­
tinue indefinitely, yet the outcome is quite predictable: 
Rosenthal will remain convinced that the Experimenter Bias 
Effect is a real phenomena, and Barber will remain sure that 
he has demonstrated its nonexistence. But how can that be? 
How can two diametrically opposed views be "supported" by 
the same "evidence"? In a commentary on the Rosenthal and 
Barber exchange, Levy (1969) suggests that this collective 
monologue is a predictable outcome of experimentation that 
is more procedural than theoretical. Levy broadens the scope 
of the controversy and questions the value of the replication 
process itself:
The perfect replication is a fiction, and I shall take 
the heretical position that this is just as well . . .
For obvious reasons, no experiment can ever duplicate 
another in every detail, and so this question (of repli­
cation) turns on whether the variations between (pro­
posed replications are) trivial or important. . . . this 
choice . . . requires either a theory which states the 
parameters involved in (an experimental effect) or a 
body of systematic research from which these parameters 
might be induced . . . Thus whether the findings of 
Barber et al. can be taken as contradictory to those of 
Rostenthal . . . is a moot question, and this, I would 
suggest will be found true wherever replications are
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attempted of experiments dealing with phenomena which 
are not embedded either within some theoretical frame­
work or extensive body of systematic research (p. 15).
If, however, the phenomena to be investigated are part of an
explicit conceptual formulation, then salient characteristics
of the sampled populations can be delineated. Results from
experiments in which samples are drawn explicitly from the
same populations are of interest and experimentation with
other populations— whose characteristics are explicitly
stated--can then provide some information about the generality
of the results.
Hume's Paradox— No Solution 
Generality is one of the major aims and problems of 
experimental psychology. To generalize is to make an induc­
tive leap. Statistical models and empirical prescriptions 
for replication have attempted to automate and legislate that 
leap. In this regard, they have failed, though no doubt 
statistical and empirical evidence is quite useful to the 
researcher compiling a case for an inductive inference.
Hume has classically stated the paradox of induction 
— it is illogical and it is unavoidable:
The idea of a necessary connexion among events arises 
from a number of similar instances which occur in the 
constant conjunction of these events . . . There is noth­
ing in a number of instances, different from every singly 
instance . . . except only, that after a repetition of 
similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the 
appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, 
and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, there­
fore, which we feel in the mind . . .  is the sentiment 
or impression from which we form the idea of power or 
necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case (II, 
vii) .
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In experimental psychology, those "feelings" of certainty 
arise from compelling arguments that make use of statistical, 
empirical and rational evidence. Ultimately, such arguments 
derive their force from the theoretical sense that they make 
rather then simply from the extent to which they adhere to 
certain formal content-free inductive techniques.
Focus of the Present Study 
The study to be presented examines the effect of 
clausal analyses on the storage and retrieval of information 
presented in a specific class of sentences. In addition, 
the lexical and surface structure cues that relate to the 
clause structure of the sentence are considered. The experi­
mental paradigm used to study these issues is the probe 
paradigm.
Experimental Psycholinguistics: The Probe Paradigm
as a Tool for Investigating Linguistic 
Structures and Perceptual Strategies 
In a probe-latency experiment, a sentence is presented 
to a subject. The sentence is immediately (i.e., within 50 
msec) followed by a word that may or may not have been in the 
sentence. The subject's task is to indicate as quickly as 
possible whether or not that word (the probe) appeared in the 
sentence. The dependent measure is the reaction time.
Presumably, in order for subjects to perform the 
rather simple task they must search a stored representation 
of the sentence after the probe word is encountered. If
clausal analysis is an important procedure in sentence inter­
pretation, then it is a reasonable corollary to suppose that 
a sentence is stored clause-by-clause. But, until the 
decision of what constitutes a clause is made, the elements 
of the sentence will be held in an immediate memory buffer.
The buffer is emptied when it contains a complete clause, and 
the clause as a whole is stored in short-term memory. Elements 
from a common clause are stored together and separated from 
elements of another clause. If a search of short-term and 
immediate memory is undertaken, the prediction is that the 
search will also proceed clause-by-clause, and that informa­
tion stored in earlier clauses is less accessible than infor-
29mation from more recently stored clauses. The difference 
in accessibility of material in earlier and later clauses is 
experimentally examined by comparing reaction times to probes 
from each clause.
Caplan (1972) constructed pairs of sentences which 
shared common lexical material. As in the Garrett et al.
(1966) study, the common material was cross-recorded to 
insure that subjects would hear the same local acoustic cues 
with each version. For all sentence pairs, the first common 
word was, in one member, the last word before the clause 
boundary, while in the other pair member, the word came 
directly after the clause boundary. For example:
29Note that as in the click studies, this research 
is concerned with the .psychological reality of clause 
structures, not the processes that underlie the use of such 
structures.
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22a. When the sun warms the earth after the rain, 
clouds soon disappear.
22b. When a high pressure front approaches, rain 
clouds soon disappear.
If linguistic material is stored and retrieved in a clause-by- 
clause fashion, then the accessibility of the word "rain" 
ought to increase from 22a to 22b since "rain" will be 
stored as part of the first clause in 22a and part of the 
second clause in 22b. Results supported the prediction; probe 
words from the final clause consistently provoked shorter 
reaction times than probes from the first clause.
It is tempting to infer from this study that sentences 
are stored clause-by-clause and that this implies a last-in- 
easiest-out retrieval process. But the results equally sup­
port the following description: sentences are stored clause-
by-clause, and a labeling of the structural relationship 
between the clauses is also stored; information from the main 
clause is more accessible than information from the subordi­
nate clause. Here, in addition to a clausal analysis, a 
surface-structure analysis utilizing heuristic B would con­
tribute to the way in which grammatical material is stored.
And the retrieval process would be sensitive to the storage 
method. Heuristic B is easily applicable to all the sentences 
in the study since each initial subordinate clause is intro­
duced by an adverb that clearly marks the embedding. There­
fore, since all of the sentences that Caplan used were of the 
form: subordinate clause/main clause, there is no way of
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deciding between the alternative descriptions.
By utilizing both subordinate/main and main/sub- 
ordinate type sentences, as well as coordinate sentences 
that could be described as main/main, Kornfeld (1974) 
attempted to assess the independent contributions of the 
temporal order of the clauses and the dominance relationship 
between the clauses. The effect of temporal order was strong­
est for coordinate sentences which by definition show no 
dominance relationship between clauses. For complex sentences 
with adverbial clauses, both clause recency and dominance 
effects were present, but the nature of their combined effect 
was relatively unstable. In one experiment, the variables 
operated in a more or less additive fashion. That is, probes 
from first clauses that were subordinate evoked the longest 
reaction times while probes from second clauses that were 
main evoked the shortest reaction times. But, in another 
experiment, the dominance variable overrode any reaction time 
decrements due to recency.
Note that the conflicting experiments used different 
types of lexical items in the stimulus sentences. More spe­
cifically, in the experiment where dominance was the over­
riding variable, relative and complement clause types were 
investigated as well as adverbial clauses. Thus, in an 
effort to keep the multiple versions of each sentence as 
alike as possible, many of the sentences with adverbial 
clauses also contained markers that could dominate subject or 
object complement clauses. These complement markers were
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either main verbs, head nouns, modal auxilaries, or adjectives. 
In the other experiment, where dominance and recency were 
additive, only sentences containing adverbial clauses were 
used. Thus, the incidence of complement markers was extremely 
low. Recall that in some situations (Garrett et al., 1966) 
the perceptual complexity of a sentence is increased by the 
inclusion of a verb or other lexical marker that is compati­
ble with multiple constructions. Thus, it is not too sur­
prising that the results from an experiment with complex 
lexical items do not mirror the results from a similar experi­
ment with simpler lexical items. This recency vs. dominance 
or recency plus dominance issue is still unresolved.
In addition, it is obvious that there are other 
variables besides clause structure that contribute to the 
reaction time, such as the length of the sentence, the dis­
tance from the probe word to the end of the sentence, the type 
of response (vocal or manual) that a subject must give, etc.
The prediction is that reaction time differences will be 
reflections of clause boundary differences--other things 
being equal. Lang (1974) found that it is not possible to 
compare sentences that differ by four or more syllables either 
in length or in probe distance. Such differences in the 
external characteristics of the sentence can mask the effects 
of structural differences.
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Experimental Psycholinguistics: Clausal, Lexical,
and Surface-Structure Analyses 
In order to use the probe paradigm to investigate 
structural aspects of sentence processing, attention should 
be paid not only to the major structural variable of interest 
(in this case clause boundaries), but also to the lexical 
and surface-structure features of the sentence that may ease 
or complicate the interpretation of the sentence, and to the 
external characteristics of sentences to be compared. In the 
study to be presented, this is accomplished in the following 
manner:
Manipulated variables:
A. Temporal order of the clause (a perceptual variable)-- 
the probe is either from the first or second clause of 
the sentence.
B. Type of clause (a structural variable)--the probe is 
either from the subordinate or main clause of the 
sentence.
Controlled variables:
A. Although only complex sentences with adverbial clauses 
are considered, the lexical items of each sentence readily 
allow for the construction of complement clause versions 
of each sentence.
B. All initial subordinate clauses contain surface-structure 
cues that mark the embedding.
C. Only sentences with identical external characteristics 
(i.e., length of the sentence and probe distance in
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syllables) are compared.
Moreover, both subjects and language materials are 
conceptualized as random factors. That is, the experimental 
effects are of interest because it is assumed that they are 
not restricted to the particular subjects and materials 
sampled in this experiment. The data analyses will therefore 
include the computation of Clark's min F' statistic. This 
statistic is computed by combining information from a sub­
jects analysis (F-^ ) and a materials analysis (E^) . As a 
preliminary step toward equating the power of the F^ and F^ 
analyses, the number of subjects and sentences used in the 
experimental design will be equal.
Experimental Psycholinguistics: Methodology
In psycholinguistic research, a particular linguistic 
phenomenon is operationalized as a set of sentences that 
conform to some explicit structural description. Those 
sentences form a rather homogeneous set of experimental 
stimuli. Researchers formulate hypotheses regarding the 
specific influence of the linguistic variables, but the test­
ing of those hypotheses involves more than just distributing 
the stimuli to subjects, observing responses, and making 
causal inferences. Psycholinguists, like all other experi­
mental psychologists, must also grapple with difficult 
problems of experimental invalidity.
Campbell and Stanley (1966) have provided a concise 
and influential framework within which to assess the validity
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of an experiment; they have recommended that the concept of 
validity be divided into two parts--internal and external.
An experiment is internally invalid if experimental and con­
trol groups differ systematically along a dimension other 
than the independent variable. Such confounding makes it 
difficult for the researcher to infer that a causal relation­
ship exists between the independent and dependent variables 
in the experiment. Internal validity is the first requisite 
of any study. If an experiment is internally valid--if, that 
is, the experimenter exerted appropriate and powerful control 
over the variables relevant to his/her results--then he/she 
will wish to make some broad statements about the generality 
of the phenomenon just observed in the laboratory. An experi­
ment is externally invalid to the extent that the sample or 
laboratory situation is an inaccurate copy of the population 
or "real world" to which one wishes to generalize the 
results.
When sets of linguistic stimuli are constructed for 
an experiment, the aim is to make the sets alike on all rele­
vant variables except one--the independent variable. Deter­
mining which variables are and are not relevant is in part an 
intuitive decision that researchers make based on theoretical 
information and research experience. Perhaps the most
30One way to conceptualize the difference between fac­
tors that jeopardize the internal and external validity of a 
study is to consider how the effects of those factors would be 
discussed within the analysis of variance model. Factors 
affecting internal validity add alternative main effect state­
ments to the design; factors affecting external validity neces­
sitate the addition of interaction statements to the design.
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important function of the scientific community is to criti­
cally evaluate a study--to determine whether there are 
plausible alternative explanations of the results. An experi­
ment that is relatively internally valid, then, is one in 
which potentially confounding variables have been isolated 
and successfully controlled.
When a number of experiments are conducted in sequence, 
using the same experimental paradigm, the result is normally 
a substantial increase in internal validity. For example,
Fodor and Bever (1965) have suggested that errors in sub­
jectively locating a click in a sentence are predictable on 
syntactic grounds: that is, constituents such as phrases or
clauses show a resistance to interruption and so clicks tend 
to be displaced to the constituent boundaries. But, for the 
stimuli used, there is an alternative explanation for the 
displacing. There is a longer acoustic pause at constituent 
boundaries than at other places in the sentence. Perhaps it 
is the pause, per se, that is attracting the click, rather 
than any more abstract properties of the sentence. In fact, 
the authors report that Garrett, in an unpublished experiment, 
has demonstrated such an effect with random digits. In 
order to eliminate the confounding of the syntactic and 
acoustic variables, Garrett, et al. (1966) constructed pairs 
of sentences like the following:
9a. (In her hope of marrying) Ann was surely 
impractical.
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9b. (Your hope of marrying Ann) was surely 
impractical.
Since the common lexical items are recorded only once and 
then spliced onto the initial parts of each sentence, the 
prosodic cues of each sentence are identical. But the syn­
tactic structure of each sentence differs. The independent 
variable of interest is not confounded with the acoustic 
variables. The Garrett et al. study is more internally valid 
than the Fodor and Bever (1965) study. Similarly, Caplan 
(1972) has performed a series of probe latency studies and 
reports that probes from the first clause evoke longer reac­
tion times than probes from the second clause. Early studies 
compared sentences like the following:
23a. No matter how carefully you scheme, crime won't 
pay.
23b. Whenever this goalie stops the puck, fans go 
wild.
The independent variable— probe position--is, in this case, 
confounded with differences in lexical material stress, 
intonation, rhythm, etc. In order to control for these con­
founding variables, Caplan followed a procedure consistent 
with Garrett et al.'s reasoning. Sentence pairs were con­
structed that shared common lexical items but had different 
clause boundaries, as in 22a and 22b:
22a. When the sun warms the earth after the rain, 
clouds soon disappear.
22b. When a high pressure front approaches, rain 
clouds soon disappear.
Controlling for lexical difference increased the internal 
validity of the experiment. Kornfeld (1974), however, pointed 
out that additional confounding still remained. Although 
first-clause probes continued to evoke longer reaction times 
than second-clause probes, the effect might be due to the 
clause-boundary effect,or to the type of clause that included 
the probe (the first clause was always subordinate, the second 
clause was always main), or to the syntactic category of the 
probe word (probes in the first clause were nouns, in the 
second clause adjectives). By incorporating both subordinate- 
main and main-subordinate orders, and by limiting the syntac­
tic category of all probe words to nouns, Kornfeld further 
reduced the confounding and thus increased the internal validity 
of the study.
In summary, the internal validity of an experiment 
increases as the researcher more accurately defines the 
stimuli used and thereby decreases the possibility that an 
alternative description will account for the experimental 
results. For the present study, the simulus sentences have 
been constructed and defined in such a way as to eliminate a 
number of rival explanations of the experimental effects:
1. The definitional advances of Kornfeld (1974) have been 
retained: subordinate-main and main-subordinate clause 
orders are used; and all probes are nouns.
2. Although only complex sentences with adverbial clauses
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are considered, the lexical items of each sentence readily 
allow for the construction of complement clause versions 
of each sentence.
3. Since differences in the external characteristics of
sentences (number of syllables in the sentence, probe
distance length in syllables) can produce differences in 
reaction times, all sentences were identical with respect 
to these external characteristics.
Thus there is good reason to expect that any results obtained 
will be due to the manipulation of the variables of interest 
(probe position and type of clause) although additional refine 
ment of the paradigm must inevitably follow.
The Inclusion of Filler Sentences. Once a well-
defined set of sentences has been constructed to relatively
unambiguously embody a particular independent variable, then 
the external validity of the study may be considered. In 
assessing the degree to which the experimental or laboratory 
findings might be generalized to real situations two related 
concerns arise:
1. The problem of artificiality: are sentences constructed 
for a laboratory experiment like sentences spontaneously 
used in the real world?
2. The problem of reactivity: does the subject's awareness 
of being measured alter the processes involved in sen­
tence interpretation?
Both problems are, in an absolute sense, insoluble. Most 
experimental sessions are quite unlike any non-laboratory
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situation: tones and buzzers precede and follow sentences,
the sentences are not related to any topic of discourse, and 
some sort of question is asked after every sentence. Sub­
jects are quite aware that they are participating in an 
experiment and are hooked up to some type of reaction-time 
device.
Still there are aspects of experimental design that 
can be used to attenuate though not eliminate the arti­
ficiality and reactivity. In the present context, filler 
sentences (sentences that do not meet the requirements 
defined for the experimental sentences) should be included 
in any study to increase its external validity. Filler 
sentences are structurally more heterogeneous than the experi­
mental sentences. (In the present study, all experimental 
sentences contain two clauses, one of which is adverbial; 
the fillers are not so restricted, and include coordinate 
clauses which themselves may contain infinitivals and other 
subordinate structures.) With the inclusion of filler sen­
tences, the array of sentences presented to subjects is not 
the repetitive structural array that would result from just 
presenting the experimental sentences.
More importantly, the heterogeneity of filler sen­
tences disguises the intent of the study. Orne (1962) has 
suggested that when reactive measures are used, researchers 
must consider the active problem-solving characteristics of 
their subjects, and their propensity to be "good" subjects.
The reactions of subjects are always joint functions of both
the experimental manipulation and the hypotheses subjects 
formulate about the nature of the investigation. If experi­
mental sentences are used exclusively, then it may become 
relatively easy for subjects to figure out the expected 
response and produce it. For example, with the probe para­
digm, after hearing a number of the experimental sentences, 
subjects might easily surmise that the best strategy for 
achieving short reaction times would be to signal "IN" as 
quickly as possible after the probe word. The experimental 
task would, in that case, have changed from sentence compre­
hension to monitoring, and the new task is unrelated to the 
purpose of the experiment--to investigate the structures 
involved in sentence processing. But, if the experimental 
sentences are interspersed among a set of filler sentences 
that are structurally different from each other and from the 
experimental sentences, and if those fillers are followed by 
probe words that are sometimes not from the sentence, then 
it is quite unlikely that subjects will form uniform and 
correct predictions about what they should do on the succeed­
ing sentences. In addition, subjects were told initially 
that periodically they would be asked to paraphrase a sen­
tence just heard. Thus, a number of precautions helped to 
insure that subjects listened to each sentence for its mean­
ing.
Despite their name then, filler sentences serve a 
critical methodological function in psycholinguistic research. 
Their inclusion increases the external validity of the study,
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thereby making more legitimate the generalizations that experi­
mental researchers make about linguistic abilities.
The Analysis of Filler Sentences. Though the use of 
filler sentences in a psycholinguistic experiment is an all 
but automatic procedure, the analysis of data from those 
sentences is non-existent. Data from filler sentences is 
characteristically collected from subjects for whom each 
sentence is as important as any other sentence. Data from 
filler sentences is ignored by researchers for whom such data 
is useless and uninteresting, a half-hearted and unexamined 
attempt to control some "nuisance" variability.
Lang (1974) has suggested, however, that data from 
filler sentences provides the researcher with the unique 
opportunity to verify empirically the implicit and common 
assumption that the random assignment of subjects to experi­
mental groups results in groups that are initially equal and 
interchangable. The filler sentences can be conceptualized 
as a variable of "no treatment." If it can be shown that 
when groups of subjects are treated alike there are no 
resulting differences between the groups, then differences 
between experimental groups can be more strongly attributed 
to the treatment variables. A filler analysis that supports 
the hypothesis of the initial equality of the groups adds a 
measure of internal validity to the study. The filler 
analysis, that is, gives the researcher added confidence that 
the samples are indeed equivalent due to random sampling, and 
that the experimental instructions were interpreted correctly,
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without systematic bias.
There is an alternative conception of the role of a 
filler analysis. Filler sentences may be conceived of as a 
variable that measures "context" effects. Although each 
group will receive the same filler sentences and probes, the 
other sentences that each group hears will not be identical. 
Each group will hear sentences that uniquely represent spe­
cific levels of the independent variables to be studied. The 
differences in those sentences could lead to the formation of 
different response sets across the different subject groups. 
The filler analysis provides a check on this.
In the present study, filler sentences are an integral 
part of both the experimental procedures and the data analy­
ses .
Experimental Psycholinguistics: Exploration
It has been shown that probe tasks are sensitive to 
the grammatical structure of linguistic material (Caplan,.,
1972; Fodor et al., 1974). What of the sensitivity of the 
probe task to non-grammatical variables? Specifically, the 
following questions are asked:
1. When adjacent words from the same clause are independently 
probed, will the temporal order of the words be reflected 
in reliable reaction-time differences?
If the temporal order of linguistic material within 
a clause follows the same pattern of storage and retrieval as 
do multiple clauses then the answer will be "yes." If the
syntactic relationships among words within a clause interacts 
with the recording of the temporal order of the words, then 
the answer will be "no," or at least "not necessarily."
2. When the probe word is not from the sentence, will probes 
that are phonetically related to a word in the sentence 
evoke reliably different reaction times than probes that 
are neither from the sentence nor related in any way to 
words in the sentence?
Preliminary research by Limber and Lang (1975) sug­
gested that probes which rhyme with a word in the sentence are 
particularly troublesome to individuals learning English as a 
second language. It may be that this confusion effect of 
rhyming probes is limited to individuals learning the language, 
or it may be a general characteristic of all language users, 
with second-language learners and native speakers differing 
only in the magnitude of this confusion effect.
In a preliminary attempt to address these issues, 
half of the filler sentences from the present study are used 
with a number of different probe types. Specifically, adja­
cent words from the same clause are independently probed; and 
probes that rhyme with a word in the sentence are compared 
with probes that do not.
Goals of the Present Study
1. To define the relationship between the perceptual vari­
able of temporal order of clauses and the structural 
variable of type of clause for a restricted class of
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of sentences (complex sentences with adverbial clauses 
containing syntactically complex verbs).
2. To examine the implications that min F' analyses have 
on the design of psycholinguistic experiments.
3. To illustrate the value of filler sentences in the design 
and analyses of psycholinguistic research.
4. To explore the potential of the probe paradigm as a tool 
for investigating the importance of the temporal order 
of words within a clause.
5. To investigate the effects of various probe types on 
native English speakers.
METHOD
Variables and Hypotheses 
Design 1
The probe paradigm was used to investigate the 
clausal analyses that underlie the storage and retrieval of 
linguistic information in a class of complex sentences. Spe­
cifically, the independent and interactive effects of two 
variables were studied: the temporal order of the clauses
and the dominance relationship between the clauses. Temporal 
order was investigated by probing a word from either the 
first or the second clause; dominance was indexed by the type 
of clause that the probe was in--subordinate or main.








Critical sentences were adapted from those used by 
Kornfeld (1974). There were four versions of each sentence. 
Each version conformed to the specific description of one 
cell in the design. In the following diagram, each line 
represents a clause and is labeled either subordinate (S) or
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main (M), and "x" represents the position of the probe:




M , x S
M x, S
S , x M
Although only complex sentences with adverbial clauses are 
considered, the lexical items of each sentence readily allow 
for the construction of complement clause versions of each 
sentence. Thus, these sentences contain a high incidence of 
markers that can dominate subject or object complement clauses. 
In this way, the present findings would be useful for compara­
tive purposes for future research dealing with non-adverbial 
constructions. Lexical and semantic differences within each 
sentence set were minimized. The same probe word was used in 
all versions of a sentence set, and the syntactic category 
of that probe was constant across all versions. The sentence 
length and probe distance in syllables were identical for all 
versions of all sentence sets: all sentences were 24 sylla­
bles long, and the probe was always 12 syllables from the end 
of the sentence.
Twenty sentence sets were used. The following set 
illustrates how the above restrictions combine to form a 
sentence set:
Critical sentence #1, probe word LAND
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version a. When the greedy rancher began purchasing
land, fanning plots became quite scarce in 
Suffolk county.
b. The greedy rancher tried to purchase farms 
when land was becoming more and more scarce 
in Suffolk county.
c. The greedy old rancher tried to purchase more 
land when farms were becoming scarce in Suf­
folk county.
d. When the greedy old rancher began purchasing 
farms, land quickly became quite scarce in 
Suffolk county.
A complete list of sentence sets appears in Appendix A. .
If, all things being equal, material from second 
clauses was more accessible than material from first clauses, 
then there should be an overall main effect for the probe 
position factor; and the mean for probe position - 1 ought to 
be significantly greater than the mean for probe position - 2.
If, all things being equal, material from main 
clauses was more accessible than material from subordinate 
clauses, then there should be an overall main effect for the 
type of clause factor; and the mean for subordinate clauses 
ought to be significantly greater than the mean for main 
clauses.
If the independent effects of both variables were 
additive (i.e., there is no significant interaction), then 
the four cells in the design ought to be rank ordered in the
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following way: the cell with version (a) sentences ought to
have the largest mean reaction time; the cell with version (d) 
sentences ought to have the shortest. The (b) and (c) ver­
sion cells ought to be intermediate--the particular rank 
ordering depending on the relative strengths of the two inde­
pendent variables.
Figure 3 represents the hypothesized relationships 
among the cell means ("+" indicates a relative increase in 
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Figure 3. Hypothesized rank ordering of the cell 
means from design 1.
Design 2
In order to decrease the liklihood of subjects forming 
a response set to the homogeneous set of critical sentences, 
twenty filler sentences were constructed and integrated with 
the critical sentences. All filler sentences were complex 
sentences, 24 syllables long. To discourage position sets the 
probes from 14 fillers-were 6 or 18 syllables from the end
of the sentence. To discourage subjects from automatically 
responding "in" to each probe, six other fillers had probe 
words that were not found in the sentence. A complete list 
of filler sentences appears in Appendix B. The sentences 
on the list are grouped according to type of sentence and 
temporal position of the probe.
Filler sentences were thus used to mask the intent of 
the study. In addition, the data from filler sentences can 
be used to test the implicit assumption that differences 
between groups (in design 1) were due to treatment differences 
rather than to either any intrinsic differences between the 
groups per se, or to differences that might be due to response 
sets that different combinations of experimental sentences 
might encourage. In the present study, the performance of 
the four groups of subjects from the previous design was 
examined under the condition of no treatment. That is, all 
four groups received the same treatment--the same 20 filler 
sentences and the same probes. The design can be outlined as 
follows.
Subject Groups 
1 2 3 4
Group 1 contained the subjects who received version (a) of 
the critical sentences; group 2, version (b); etc.
Design 1 thus examined subject groups that were 
treated differently, while design 2 looked at those same sub­
ject groups when they were treated alike. The hypothesis was 
that there would be no significant differences between the 
groups in design 2. Randomly selected groups treated alike 
would respond, on the average, alike. Further, the contextual 
differences between the groups would not be significant.
Design 3
Twenty filler sentences with the same external 
characteristics as those used in design 2 were constructed.
For each of these sentences, however, four different probe 
words were used: IN, OUT, RHYME, and ADJACENT-IN. The 
probe in the IN group was a word from the sentence that was 
either 18, 12, or 6 syllables from the end of the sentence.
In the OUT condition, the probe was not from the sentence and 
had no relation to any word from the sentence. A word that 
rhymes with the IN-word was the probe in the RHYME condition; 
and the word immediately preceding the IN-word was probed in 
the ADJACENT-IN condition. A prototypic example:
Because the tall young man was so strikingly handsome, 
he looked terrific in all kinds of clothing, 
probes: (IN) (OUT) (RHYME) (ADJ.-IN)
MAN JOB PAN YOUNG
A complete list of the filler sentences and the four probes 
appears in Appendix C. Again, the sentences are grouped by 
sentence type and probe position.
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If the temporal order of linguistic material within a 
clause followed the same pattern of storage and retrieval as 
do multiple clauses, then the mean reaction time for the 
ADJACENT-IN group ought to be greater than the mean reaction 
time for the IN group. If deciding that a probe was not from 
a sentence required a search of both clauses in the sentence, 
then the mean reaction time for the OUT group ought to be 
longer than either the IN or the ADJACENT-IN group means.
Preliminary research by Limber and Lang (1975) sug­
gested that, for individuals learning English as a second 
language, probes which rhyme with a word in the sentence 
evoked longer reaction times than either probes from the sen­
tence or probes that are not from the sentence and do not 
rhyme with any word in the sentence. The RHYME group was 
included in the present study to investigate the magnitude of 
that confusion effect in native speakers. It was hypothesized 
that the mean reaction time for the RHYME group would be the 
largest of the four.
Probes in the IN group were either 18, 12, or 6 
syllables from the end of the sentence. ADJACENT-IN probes 
were also distributed throughout various positions in the sen­
tence. Thus, if reaction time to a probe was related to the 
temporal position of that word in the sentence, then the 
reaction times that contribute to both the IN and ADJACENT-IN 
means ought to be relatively diverse. Conversely, for the OUT 
group, the task was very nearly the same for each sentence: 
to make a complete search of a 24-syllable sentence. The
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variance of the OUT group should be the smallest of the four; 
the variances of the IN and ADJACENT-IN groups should be 
larger, and roughly comparable to each other. The variance 
of the RHYME group should be intermediate: smaller than
either the IN or ADJACENT-IN group variances because the 
RHYME task too was very similar each time; but larger than 
the OUT group because the probes were phonetically related to 
words that were distributed throughout the sentence.
Each subject group as defined in designs 1 and 2 
received one type of probe. Thus, the design was as follows:
Type of Probe 
IN OUT RHYME ADJACENT-IN
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Sx, M M, xS Mx, S S, xM
In a strict sense, designs 1 and 3 were confounded: 
each subject group was exposed to a unique combination of 
variables from both designs. Yet, other aspects of the design 
mitigated the confounding. It might be argued that the addi­
tion of design 3 encouraged the four subject groups to develop 
different response sets to the sentences: for groups 1 and
4, only 6 out of 60 times during the experiment was OUT the 
correct response; while for groups 2 and 3, OUT was a correct 
response 26 out of 60 times. Those IN/OUT percentage dif­
ferences could have been responsible for design 1 differences. 
But, any response sets that affected design 1 reaction times
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should also have affected design 2 reaction times. Thus, the 
analysis of data from design 2 becomes an important measure 
of the "context" effect. Further, since the IN/OUT per­
centages for groups 1 and 4 were identical, their "response 
sets" should have been quite similar. Yet, recall that for 
design 1, those two groups were predicted to be the largest 
and the smallest of the four.
Tapes and Equipment
Four tapes were used in the present experiment. Each 
tape contained 60 sentences (20 critical sentences, 20 fillers 
from design 2, and 20 fillers from design 3). Only one ver­
sion of each critical sentence and only one probe type for 
the filler sentences from design 3 was used in each tape. The 
fillers and probes from design 2 were identical on all tapes. 
The make-up of the four tapes is summarized in Figure 4. The 
order of the 60 sentences was randomly determined and was the 
same for all four tapes. A chart of the random sentence order 
appears in Appendix D.
The sentences were recorded on a Dokorder 7140 4-track 
recorder. In order to minimize intonation and stress effects, 
the sentences were read by a male speaker in a neutral and 
steady manner. After each sentence, a 500 Hz 50 msec low- 
intensity tone was spliced onto the tape to indicate the end 
of the sentence to the subject. This was necessary to pre­
vent the probe from being interpreted as part of the sentence, 
(Caplan, 1970). After the tone, 100 msec of leader tape was
Tape A
20 criticals--version (a)
S x , _M__
20 fillers from design 2




20 criticals--version (b) 
_M , x S
20 fillers from design 2
20 fillers from design 3—  
version (b) 
OUT probes
Ta p e C
20 criticals--version (c)
M x , _S__
20 fillers from design 2




20 criticals--version (d) 
_S___, x M
20 fillers from design 2




Figure 4. Schematic outline of the sentences that 
appeared in each of the four tapes used in the experiment 
(designs 1, 2, and 3).
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added. The probe word directly followed the leader tape. A 
high-frequency noise burst (5000 Hz) located on a second 
channel, and inaudible to the subject, activated a msec timer 
at the onset of the probe word. The subject's response stopped 
the timer. The delay between sentences was two seconds.
Another 500-Hz 50 msec low-intensity tone preceded the next 
sentence. This pattern, illustrated in Figure 5, was 
repeated for each sentence.
Although only one channel of the tape was audible to 
the subject, the earphone plug was wired so that the subject 
heard that one channel in both ears.
Movement of a balance toggle-switch to one of two 
positions stopped the msec timer.
Subjects
Sixty-eight undergraduates from Grand Valley State 
Colleges were used. All subjects were enrolled in an intro­
ductory psychology class and participated in the experiment 
for extra credit. All were right-handed native English 
speakers without any history of hearing difficulties.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four groups. 
There were 17 subjects in each group. Subjects in group 1 
listened to tape A; group 2, B; etc.
Procedure
The subjects were told that they were participating in 
an experiment in auditory perception. They were to listen 
to the sentences presented to them and to indicate whether
















Figure 5. Schematic outline of the arrangement of sentences, probes, and 
tones on the experimental tapes. Kjl
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whether they thought the word coming immediately after each 
sentence had been in the preceding sentence. If they thought 
the probe had been in the sentence, they were to push the 
toggle switch to the position marked IN; if the probe was not 
from the sentence, the toggle switch was to be pushed to the 
OUT position. All subjects responded on all trials with 
their right hand. Subjects were instructed to make their 
responses as quickly as possible. They were permitted to 
correct any errors they thought they had made before the pre­
sentation of the next sentence. Incorrect responses that 
were immediately corrected were counted; all other incorrect 
responses were discounted. In addition, three times during 
the experiment, subjects were asked to paraphrase the pre­
vious sentence. The paraphrase trials were randomly deter- 
minded for each subject. The text of the instructions is pre­
sented in Appendix E. Reaction times and errors were recorded 
by the experimenter.
Reduction of the Number of Stimulus 
S eh t enc e s Ana 1 yz ed
Although 20 sentences were constructed for each 
design, data from only 17 sentence was utilized in each 
analysis.
In design 1 (the critical sentences) for sentences 4,
9, and 12, the time did not reliably start at the beginning 
of the probe word. Thus, the reaction times of subjects' 
responses could not be accurately recorded.
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In design 2 (identical fillers and probes for all sub­
jects), data from sentence 7 was not included in the analysis.
7. Their new furniture was delivered and they were 
surprised by how beautiful the room now looked.
WAS
Of all the sentences used, criticals and fillers, this sentence 
was the only one in which subjects erroneously said the 
probe was not in the sentence and did not then spontaneously 
correct their mistakes. Moreover, for those subjects who 
responded correctly, the reaction times were inordinately 
long. The mean reaction time for sentence 7 across all groups 
was 1214 msec as compared with a 662 msec mean reaction time 
across all groups for the 17 fillers. The problem seems to 
be that the second clause contains the word WERE, which 
because of its relation to WAS complicates the task. Although 
subjects from all four groups performed similarly on sentence 
7, that sentence was not included in the analysis because, 
when the erroneous responses were dropped, that sentence con­
tained 12 missing cells. In order to equate the number of 
sentences analyzed in design 2 with the number in design 1, 
two additional sentences were dropped. Sentences 2 and 6 were 
selected from a random draw.
In design 3 (same sentence, different probe word for 
each subject group), sentences 23 and 31 were dropped because 
two of the four probe words were inadvertently recorded on 
the wrong tape. Data from sentence 25 was also eliminated 
from the analysis.
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Martha likes to walk three miles every day, but some­
times when it is snowing or raining she does not walk.
THREE WALK FREE SOX
Only after a majority of the subjects were run was it noticed
the probe word for the ADJACENT-IN condition (WALK) appears in 
the sentence twice.
Missing Data
Each design was made up of a data matrix of 1156 
cells: four groups of 17 subjects responded to 17 sentences.
Because of occasional equipment failure or incorrect subject 
responses (those incorrect responses that were not simul­
taneously corrected), a small number of cells in each design 
(11 in design 1; 14 in design 2; 12 in design 3) have been 
estimated by using the following formula:
g + ( ^  - g) + (S ■ - g)
In design 1, if subject #i did not respond to sentence #j , 
then that data point would be estimated as follows: g is the
mean of all subjects on all sentences for the group in which 
the missing cell appears; is the mean of all the sentences 
#i did not respond to; and S is the mean of all other sub­
jects on sentence #j . The missing point is thus estimated by 
the group mean adjusted for the particular contributions that 
might be expected from the subject and the sentence inde­
pendently. The procedure does not take into account any 
unique subject x sentence contribution. By assuming that
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contribution to be zero, this estimation procedures tends to 
reduce the error variability. However, since the number of 
missing cells estimated in each design is never more than 
2.17 percent of the total number of cells in the design, the 






Analysis of Critical Sentences (Design 1)
When the variables of Probe Position (first clause, 
second clause) and Type of Clause (.subordinate, main) were 
crossed, four experimental groups resulted. The data from 
each experimental group was combined into one mean reaction 
time score. The mean of each experimental group as well as 
marginal means and the grand mean are presented in Table 1. 
These means were obtained by averaging across sentences and 
then subjects or equivalently, across subjects and then sen­
tences. Either order of averaging necessarily produces 
indentical mean reaction times, but the variability associated 
with the mean changes with the variability of the last vari­
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Sentences (Design 1): Mean Reaction Times of the
Four Experimental Groups, Marginal Means, 
and the Grand Mean
Type of Clause
Subordinate Main____Totals
First Clause 761.18 745.74 753.46
Second Clause 730.29 580.68 655.48
745.73 663.21 704.47
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Averaging the data points, or averaging row means, or averag­
ing column means produces the same group mean:
_ (k + 1 + . . . + y + z) + J-2' + J-j +
g  =    =  -------------------------
16 4
_ + j 2 + j3 + j4
4
But, there is different variability associated with each 
method, since it is extremely unlikely that the variability
of k,l, . . . y, z is equal to the variability of J 's; andcL
that either of these are equal to the variability of
Accordingly, in the present study, the means of the 
treatment groups are examined in light of variability associ­
ated with the three methods of obtaining those means, the J 
row means are subject means; and a subjects analysis (E\) 
considers the between group differences relative to the dif­
ferences among subjects. The j^ column means are sentence 
means; and a materials analysis considers the between
group differences relative to the differences among sentences. 
Clark's (1973) formula for min F' uses F-^  and ^  to approxi­
mate the analysis computed on the raw data matrix.
Subject Analysis
Each subject's 17 responses to the critical sentences 
were combined into one mean reaction-time score (Table 2).
This data was analyzed as a 2 x 2 between-subjects design,
Probe Position (first or second clause) by Type of Clause 
(subordinate or main). The analysis of variance summary is
83
Table 2
Critical Sentences (Design 1): Mean Reaction Times
of Each Subject across 17 Sentences
Subject Subordinate Clause Subject Main Clause
Probe Position : First Clause
1 823.17 35 742.76
2 771.82 36 806.17
3 789.94 37 645.41
4 675.00 38 801.82
5 761.17 39 659.29
6 827.94 40 687.17
7 815.76 41 766.11
8 662.52 42 698.00
9 874.88 43 689.00
10 787.58 44 650.00
11 713.35 45 876.23
12 743.70 46 520.29
13 714.41 47 1038.94
14 730.64 48 636.58
15 662.35 49 940.35
16 667.00 50 564.35
17 918.76 51 955.11
Probe Position : Second Clause
18 932.82 52 633.25
19 692.11 53 524.11
20 655.17 54 560.23
21 697.17 55 474.29
22 661.17 56 700.82
23 764.82 57 569.64
24 710.41 58 635.29
25 789.29 59 531.17
26 645.58 60 584.94
27 567.05 61 695.47
28 755.70 62 447.88
29 633.11 63 544.17
30 426.47 64 542.82
31 809.70 ' 65 453.11
32 717.05 66 596.35
33 602.70 67 687.52
34 854.52 68 680.35
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presented in Table 3.
The main effect for Probe Position was significant 
(F = 14.78, df = 1,64, £ < .003). For the critical sen­
tences used, first-clause probes reliabily evoked longer 
reaction times than probes from the second clause. The main 
effect for Type of Clause was also highly significant (F = 
10.49, df = 1,64, p 4.0019). Reaction times to probes in a 
subordinate clause were longer than reaction times to main- 
clause probes. In addition, the interaction between Probe 
Position and Type of Clause was significant (F = 6.93, df =
1.64, p 4.01). An inspection of the cell and marginal means 
presented in Table 1 indicates that, although the direction 
of each main effect is maintained at both levels of the other 
independent variable, the magnitude of that effect is not 
maintained.
An analysis of simple main effects was performed on 
the data (Table 4). The effect of Probe Position was signifi­
cant only for probes in main clauses (F = 20.98, df = 1,64, 
p 4.003); first-clause probes evoked longer reaction times 
than second-clause probes. The effect for Type of Glause was 
significant only for second-clause probes (F = 17.23, df =
1.64, p<.0003); subordinate-clause probes evoked longer 
reaction times than main-clause probes.
Language Materials Analysis
For each sentence, the responses of all subjects in 
each experimental group combined into one mean reaction-time
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Table 3
Critical Sentences (Design 1): Analysis of
Variance over Subjects (F-^ )
Source SS df MS F E
Probe Position 
(PP) 163,187.73 1 163,187.73 14.78 .0003
Type of Clause 
(TC) 115,769.42 1 115,769.42 10.49 .0019
PP x TC 76,509.76 1 76,509.76 6.93 .0106
Subjects within 




Critical Sentences (Design 1): Analysis of
Variance over Subjects (F^)—
Simple Main Effects
Source SS df MS F E
Probe Position (PP) 
for Subordinate 8,109.70 1 8,109.70 .73 > .2
PP for Main 231,587.79 1 231,587.79 20.98 .0003
Type of Clause (TC) 
for First Clause 2,025.12 1 2,025.12 .18 > .2
TC for Second 
Clause 190,254.06 1 190.254.06 17.23 .0003
Subjects within 
Groups 706.300.70 64 11,035.94
score (Table 5). This data was analyzed as a 2 x 2 design, 
Probe Position by Type of Clause; and, since the sampling 
variable (sentences) was identical for each cell, a completely 
repeated-measures analysis was performed. This was in con­
trast to the previous between-subjects design. The analysis 
of variance summary is presented in Table 6.
The pattern of significant results was identical to 
that found in the subjects analysis. Both main effects and 
the interaction were significant (Probe Position, F = 43.37, 
df = 1,16, p <  .0 0 0 9 ; Type of elause, F = 41.37, d f =  1,16, 
p<.0009; Probe Position by Type of Clause, F = 15,20, df =
1,16, p <.01).
An analysis of simple main effects was performed on 
the data (Table 7). The Probe-Position effect was not signif­
icant for subordinate-clause probes (F = 2.20, df = 1,16).
For probes in the main clause, the Probe-Position effect was 
significant (F = 45.23, df = 1,16, p 4.0009): first-clause 
probes were longer than second-clause probes. The Type-of- 
Clause effect was significant only for second-clause probes 
(F = 69.44, df = 1,16, p 4.0009): subordinate-clause probes 
were longer than main-clause probes.
Comparison of Subjects and Language 
Materials Analysis
In all F^ - F2 comparisons, the variation due to 
treatment effects (and in this two-way analysis, the variation 
due to the interaction of treatment effects) will be identical
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Table 5
Critical Sentences (Design 1): Mean Reaction Times
to Each Sentence across 17 Subjects
Sentence Subordinate Clause Sentence Main Clause
Probe Position : First Clause
1 818.47 1 793.64
2 851.00 2 846.35
3 803.52 3 791.00
4 835.82 4 784.52
5 814.35 5 837.05
6 716.84 6 698.70
7 737.11 7 682 35
8 744.25 8 763.23
9 720.58 9 901.52
10 684.05 10 669.82
11 802.41 11 775.41
12 766.17 12 619.94
13 790.04 13 735.82
14 770.70 14 705.11
15 701.88 15 694.11
16 741.76 16 683.35
17 590.23 17 695.64
Probe Position : Second Clause
1 707.00 1 655.47
2 782.17 2 663.47
3 767.05 3 629.88
4 691.70 4 536.23
5 675.35 5 642.58
6 645.82 6 508.82
7 631.58 7 490.52
8 764.58 8 565.58
9 694.58 9 550.88
10 728.23 10 553.58
11 819.47 11 560.82
12 752.58 12 521.47
13 788.52 13 544.00
14 756.29 14 606.17
15 667.29 15 603.11
16 801.35 16 663.00
17 740.29 17 564.94
Table 6
Critical Sentences (Design 1): Analysis of Variance
over Language Materials (Fg)
Source SS df MS F £
Probe Position (PP) 163,187.73 1 163,187.73 43.37 .00009
Sentences 161,344.15 16 10,084.00
PP x Sentences 60,198.25 16 3,762.39
Type of Clause (TC) 115,769.42 1 115,769.42 41.37 .00009
TC x Sentences 44,768.11 16 2,798.00
PP x TC 76,709.76 1 76,709.76 15.20 .01
PP x TC x 




Critical Sentences (Design 1): Analysis of Variance
over Language Materials (f^)-- 
Simple Main Effects
Source SS df . MS F £
Probe Position (PP) 
for Subordinate 8,109.70 1 8,109.70 2.20 .2
PP at Subordinate 
x Sentences 59,003.61 16 3,687.72
PP for Main 231,587.79 1 231,587.79 45.23 .00009
PP at Main x 
Sentences 81,915.20 16 5,119.70
Type of Clause (TC) 
for First Clause 2,025.12 1 2,025.12 .39 .2
TC-^  x Sentences 81,657.56 16 5,103.59
TC for Second 
Clause 190,254.06 1 190.254.06 69.44 .00009
TC2 x Sentences 43,831.47 16 2,739.46
because this variation is based in means, and as the example 
matrix earlier illustrated, the same mean value results from 
either method of calculation. But the variation associated 
with error terms in each design, and hence the total variation 
of each design, will be different. This is because both 
error and total variation terms take into account the elements 
that contribute to the means, and in and FV, analyses, those 
elements are different. For design 1, compare Tables 2 and 5. 
Table 2 (subject means) lists the elements that contribute to 
the F£ analysis. Although the means for the data in Tables 2 
and 5 are identical, the variability of the numbers that con­
tribute to those means is quite different. The F-^ 's and 
of designs 2 and 3 may be similarly compared. In all cases, 
variations computed from means will be alike; variations com­
puted from elements will differ.
Analysis over Subjects and 
Language Materials
Significant F^ and Fg analyses imply that results are 
presumed to be reliable when materials are held constant and 
subjects are changed (F^), and when subjects are held constant 
and materials are changed (Fg). In order to examine the 
statistical evidence for the reliability of the effects when 
materials and subjects are simultaneously changed, an analysis 
in which both subjects and materials are sampling variables 
(i.e., random variables) needs to be considered. But both 
Winer (1971) and Clark (1973) point out that, for designs with
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fixed variables and at least two random variables, there is 
no single error term that provides an appropriate test of 
fixed factor main effects. That is, the expected mean square 
for the treatment variable (a fixed factor) contains var­
iance components due to the treatment effect and error, and 
variance components due to the interaction of the fixed factor 
with each random variable, both separately and jointly.
Using the mean square for the interaction of the fixed factor 
with one of the random variables as the error term is inade­
quate since the variance component due to the interaction of 
the fixed factor with the other random variable still remains 
in the expected mean square for the treatment variable.
Table 8, adapted from Winer (1971, p. 572) and Clark (1973, 
p. 344) illustrates the problem for a repeated-measures 
design when the researcher wishes to test the treatment effect 
against both subjects and materials simultaneously. An F^ 
analysis is inadequate since,
= r





Sources of Variance and Expected Mean Squares 
for a Repeated-Measures Design with One Fixed 
Factor and Two Random Factors
Expected Value of Mean Square
T: Treatments (p) *2 + 2 , 2 tms ^ ts
M: Language Materials (q) *2 + P*2 *  ms + pr*2 r m
S:Subjects (r) * 2 + j.2P ms + pq f
TxM:Treatments x Language 
Materials * 2 + ,J-2tms +  T + ltm
TxS:Treatments x Subjects * 2 + * L > +  ^ t s
MxS:Language Materials x 
Subjects
& 2 + p&2r ms
TxMxS:Treatments x Language 
Materials x Subjects tms
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In order to obtain a ratio that yields only the variance 
component due to treatments, certain mean squares from Table 8 
need to be combined (by simple arithematic operations) to 
produce composite mean squares. Two possibilities result:
(1) ^Treatments
MSTx S + MSTxM “ MSTxMxS
<r» 2 + , r L  *  + +
<r£2 + <r? + q<r? + <ti +<r2 + r<r? -(<r£2 +<r? )c tms M ts & tms tm c tm'
<r£2 +<T2 + q<f2 +T<fJ +  qr tms MUts tm H t
< £ 2 + d "2 +  q<T? +  r<r?c tms M ts tm
= q r a j
(2) MSTreatments + m sTxMx S
MSm c + MS„ „ TxS TxM
t^2 + <r2 + q<r2 + r<r + qrc"2 + <£2 + (T?
tms M ts tm M t tms
^  + 01L + *4 + <^ + <rL  + “4
= qr<^
Winer recommends (2) since (1) calls for a subtraction that 
could possibly lead to a negative denominator. Since com­
posite mean squares are used, the ratios are called quasi-F's. 
Clark (1973) concurs with Winer's preference for (2)
V
and labels that quasi-F ratio F'. In addition, Clark suggests 
that a combination of the simpler F-^ and Fr, analyses can be
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used to approximate F 1 . He argues as follows:
r  = MST + MSTxMxS 
MSTxS + MSTxL1
^ T xMxS t*ie only term °f the four that requires the use 
of the complete unaveraged data matrix. If the minimum value
of MSTxMxS (zero) is used, the term can be deleted and,
MSt
min F' = ------- ------
MS,p c + MS™ M TxS TxM
In terms of expected mean squares,
qr<f^






is always less than or equal to Thus, whenever min F'
is significant, F 1 is significant. Clark also presents a 
computationally simple formula for computing min F':
F1F2min F;_. x z
(i> j) -p + p J?1 t  J<2
i equal the degrees of freedom for the treatment mean square, 
and j is the nearest integer that results from the following 
formula:
J =
<Fi * V 2
2 2
F1 F2 
(—  + — ) 
n2 nl
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equals the degrees of freedom for the F^ error term and 
n.2 equals the degrees of freedom for the E^ error term.
Min F 1 values were calculated for all main and simple 
effects in which both F^ and EV, or both were significant. 
There were no main or simple main effects in which one but 
not both of the F^ and EV, analyses were significant. Table 9 
lists the results of the min F* calculations. The pattern of 
results is identical to the F^ and E^ patterns. For all 
effects (main and simple main) where F^ and F^ were signifi­
cant, min F' was significant. Table 10 presents a summary of 
the Fp  E^ and min F' findings for the critical sentences. 
Figure 6 is a graphic representation of the results of the 
statistical analyses. If groups did not differ significantly
from one another, then the points on the graph representing
31those groups were enclosed in a common box.
Analysis of Filler Sentences (Design 2)
The data from the filler sentences for each subject 
group was combined into one mean reaction-time score. The 
mean of each subject group as well as the grand mean of all 
four subject groups are presented in Table 11.
31In this Figure, and in Figures 7, 8, and 10, the 
abcissa is nominal. Therefore, points are connected by a line 
simply for visualclarity in identifying common levels of an 
independent variable. There is no attempt to imply any 
linear relationship between connected levels. Line graphs are 
used instead of bar graphs because one figure (10) represents 
a simultaneous look at the three designs. The overlapping 
nature of this illustration precludes the use of a bar graph.
Table 9
Critical Sentences (Design 1): 
Min F' Statistics
Main Effects min F ’ df E
Source:
Probe Position (PP) 11.02 1, 79 .001
Type of Probe (TC) 8.36
o001—1 .01
PP x TC 4.76 1, 74 .05
Simple Main Effects
Source:
PP at Subordinate * * *
PP at Main 14.33 1, 74 .001
TC at First Clause * * *
TC at Second Clause 13.80
o00 .001
*not calculated (both F^ and nonsignificant)
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Table 10
Critical Sentences (Design 1): Summary of Results
from F p  an^ “in F' Analyses
Main Effects F^ EV, m n^ E.'
Source:
Probe Position (PP)




PP at Subordinate all nonsignificant
PP at Main ALL SIGNIFICANT (p .05)
TC at First Clause all nonsignificant












Figure 6. The four experimental groups of design 1 
(critical sentences).
Table 11
Filler Sentences (Design 2): Mean Reaction Times for
Each Subject Group and the Grand Mean
______________ Subject Groups_________________
Grand Mean 1 2 3 4
662.25 633.23 684.00 666.97 664.81
Subjects Analysis
Each subject's 17 responses to the filler sentences 
were combined into one mean reaction-time score (Table 12). 
This data was analyzed as a between-subjects, one-factor 
design. The analysis of variance summary is presented in 
Table 13. The differences among the groups were not signifi­
cant.
Language Materials Analysis
For each sentence, the responses of all subjects in 
each group were combined into one mean reaction-time score 
(Table 14) . A one-way analysis of variance was computed and, 
with sentences as the sampling variable, a repeated-measures 
analysis was appropriate since, in each cell, the same sen­
tences were used. This was in contrast to the previous 
between-subjects design. Table 15 is the summary for the 
analysis of variance. Again, the differences among the groups 
were not significant.
Analysis over Subjects and Language Materials
Since both the subjects analysis (F^) and the materials 
analysis (£2) were nonsignificant, the analysis considering 
subjects and materials as sampling variables (min F') was not 
calculated. Figure 7 is a graphic representation of the 
results of the F-^  and Fg analyses. Since neither analysis 
showed a difference between the groups, the points that 




Sentences (Design 2): 




Subject Group 1 Subject Group 2
1 631.29 18 864.94
2 611.94 19 695.52
3 645.35 20 580.23
4 540.76 21 666.05
5 663.70 22 726.35
6 648.05 23 769.70
7 696.70 24 690.82
8 582.00 25 749.70
9 706.35 26 595.88
10 643.35 27 481.88
11 503.52 28 704.58
12 652.17 29 688.11
13 594.64 30 864.52
14 735.58 31 657.29
15 631.11 32 597.52
16 564.00 33 598.82
17 715.64 34 711.82
Group 3 Group 4
35 772.35 52 717.11
36 817.64 53 620.58
37 635.82 54 637.47
38 824.41 55 615.23
39 684.52 56 731.70
40 665.70 57 641.94
41 597.17 58 674.76
42 575.35 59 647.58
43 575.23 60 636.00
44 664.41 61 700.41
45 699.82 62 564.35
46 585.70 63 622.64
47 767.17 64 736.05
48 564.17 65 635.88
49 676.22 66 702.05
50 516.76 67 706.35
51 716.82 68 662.52
Table 13
Filler Sentences (Design 2): Analysis
of Variance over Subjects (F^)
Source SS df MS F £
Groups 22,850.24 3 7,616.74 1.26 >.2
Subjects within 




Filler Sentences (Design 2): Mean Reaction Times
to Each Sentence across 17 Subjects
________________ Subj ect Groups __________
Sentence 1 2  3 4
1 855.88 896.70 800.47 790.82
2 805.35 735.40 817.24 921.47
3 687.64 689.99 798.59 760.76
4 514.58 632.11 578.06 608.00
5 713.70 691.70 724.89 708.76
6 609.35 705.52 619.83 593.76
7 568.17 632.34 655.24 568.41
8 676.82 599.17 559.83 549.23
9 439.52 633.22 568.71 591.11
10 464.41 618.64 772.41 601.35
11 599.05 652.97 586.71 586.70
12 722.17 719.11 719.53 847.94
13 641.35 739.40 652.00 601.58
14 553.94 731.70 688.71 625.88
15 528.88 621.87 554.59 562.17
16 701.05 662.34 538.77 716.58
17 634.29 666.52 703.83 654.11
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Table 15
Filler Sentences (Design 2): Analysis of Variance
over Language Materials
Source SS df MS F E
Between Subjects 493,887.36 16 30,867.93
Groups 22,850.24 3 7,616.74 2.53 >.2
Groups x Sentences 14,400.00 48 3,000.00
Total 660,745.60
Subject Groups
Figure 7. The four subject groups of design 2 
(filler sentences).
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Analysis of Probe Types (Design 3)
Each subject group heard the same sentences, but 
different probe words for those sentences. Only one type of 
probe (IN, OUT, RHYME, ADJ-IN), was presented to each group. 
The data from each probe-type group was combined into one 
mean reaction-time score. The mean for each group as well as 
the grand mean of the four groups is presented in Table 16.
Subjects Analysis
Each subject's 17 responses to the filler sentences 
of design 3 were combined into one mean reaction-time score 
(Table 17). This data was analyzed as a between-subjects, 
one-factor design. The analysis of variance summary is pre­
sented in Table 18. The treatment effect of Type of Probe 
was significant (F = 17.93, df = 3,64, p < . 00009).
A Newman-Keuls test was performed to determine pair­
wise differences between group means. The difference between 
the IN and ADJ-IN groups was not significant. All other pair­
wise combinations were significantly different (p<.01).
Language Materials Analysis
For each sentence, the responses of all subjects in 
each probe-type group were combined into one mean reaction­
time score (Table 19). This data was analyzed as a 1 x 4 
design; and since the sampling variable (sentences) was identi­
cal for each cell, a one-way repeated-measures analysis was 
performed. This was in contrast to the previous between-
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Table 16
Probe Types (Design 3): Mean Reaction Time of the
Four Experimental Groups and the Grand Mean
Probe Types
Grand Mean IN OUT RHYME ADJ-IN
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Table 17
Probe Types (Design 3): Mean Reaction Times
for Subjects across 17 Sentences
Subject IN Subject OUT
1 661.58 18 877.17
2 649.70 19 740.76
3 716.41 20 589.41
4 475.47 21 713.35
5 662.35 22 711.47
6 672.52 23 890.58
7 760.82 24 751.47
8 590.88 25 914.23
9 732.05 26 690.29
10 707.52 27 527.47
11 536.88 28 753.52
12 595.94 29 657.70
13 633.70 30 862.47
14 622.47 31 834.11
15 627.70 32 765.11
16 561.05 33 729.47
17 674.23 34 837.88
RHYME • ADJ-IN
35 872.64 52 711.64
36 974.29 53 599.64
37 732.25 54 628.44
38 886.05 55 652.17
39 882.05 56 797.29
40 1035.41 57 676.64
41 837.05 58 712.17
42 923.17 59 718.58
43 792.47 60 627.76
44 770.29 61 816.35
45 945.35 62 440.41
46 631.17 63 663.17
47 1016.70 64 647.23
48 772.17 65 467.41
49 1006.23 66 635.23
50 759.41 67 736.82
51 827.82 68 739.52
Table 18
Probe Types (Design 3): Analysis of Variance
over Subjects (F-^ )
Source SS df MS F £
Type of Probe 524,765.87 3 174,921.95 17.93 .00009
Subjects within 




Probe Types (Design 3): Mean Reaction Times
to Each Sentence across 17 Subj ects
itence IN OUT RHYME ADJ-IN
1 806.52 867.70 1788.70 861.05
2 848.82 794.24 1004.47 796.88
3 682.35 723.94 967.88 751.88
4 656.00 698.11 913.82 606.00
5 723.70 761.05 726.64 735.64
6 677.05 736.94 723.35 671.47
7 575.35 641.64 823.23 548.41
8 555.47 680.94 815.00 884.00
9 590.41 777.00 672.05 775.35
10 562.88 842.11 799.47 546.23
11 640.11 644.00 707.05 866.35
12 515.64 809.41 762.05 578.17
13 513.88 794.58 842.52 431.05
14 695.88 761.29 652.82 598.00
15 489.76 648.82 736.70 630.35
16 692.70 904.00 882.64 465.23
17 654.76 760.64 846.23 519.29
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subjects analysis. The analysis of variance summary is pre­
sented in Table 20. The treatment effect of Type of Probe 
was significant (F = 8.96, df = 3,48, p<.05).
A Newman-Keuls test was performed to determine pair­
wise differences between group means. The pattern of results 
is identical to that found in the subjects analysis: the
difference between the IN and ADJ-IN groups was not signifi­
cant; all other pair-wise combinations were significantly 
different (p <.01).
The standard deviations for the sentence means for 
each group were computed (Table 21). From smallest to largest, 
the groups ordering of the standard deviations is: OUT, IN,
ADJ-IN', RHYME.
Analysis over Subjects and Language Materials
Because both F^ and F^ were significant, a min F 1 was 
calculated. Again, the treatment effect of Type of Probe was 
significant (min F' = 5.97, df = 3,91, p-c.001). Figure 8 




Probe Types (Design 3): Analysis of Variance
over Language Materials (F^)
Source SS df MS F E
Between Sentences 718,313.03 16 44,894.56
Type of Probe 524,765.87 3 174,921.95 8.96 .05
Type of Probe x




Probe Types (Design 3): Standard Deviations of
Sentence Means around the Probe-Type Means
Type of Probe
IN OUT RHYME ADJ-IN












Experimental Psycholinguistics: Clausal, Lexical
and Surface-Structure Analyses (Design 1)
The significant results of the analyses of the criti­
cal sentences (design 1) can be interpreted as consequences 
of the treatment variables. The pattern of the F p  an<i 
min F' analyses is consistent (Table 10). Effects were 
either always significant or always insignificant across the 
three analyses. Thus, the main and interactive effects of 
Probe Position and Type of Clause are reliable over both sub­
ject and material populations.
It is necessary, however, to designate as specifically 
as possible, the characteristics of populations to which the 
results of this study apply. The subject population is 
defined as complex English sentences having one adverbial 
subordinate clause. It is beyond the scope of this research 
to predict the effects of the variables studied on other types 
of subordinate clauses. Although only complex sentences with 
adverbial clauses are considered, the lexical items of each 
sentence readily allow for the construction of complement 
clause versions of each sentence. The population contains 
both clause orders: subordinate-main and main-subordinate.
All subordinate clauses are introduced by an adverb--a clear 
surface-structure marking of the subordination. Moreover, in
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the sample, all sentences were 24 syllables long. Although 
it would be quite meaningless to limit the findings of this 
research to only those sentences that are 24 syllables long, 
Lang (1974) has suggested that within the probe paradigm, 
reaction-time predictions about sentences can be made only 
if the syllable lengths of sentences to be compared differ 
by no more than 4 syllables. The population under considera­
tion contains groups of sentences to be compared that conform 
to this restriction. Finally, the probe task is an extremely 
easy task for any native speaker. Decisions about the 
inclusion of the probe word in the previous sentence are gen­
erally reported within three-quarters of a second. Thus, 
it is a very automatic level of linguistic processing that is 
reflected in the dependent measures.
Both Probe Position and Type of Clause produced sig­
nificant effects (Tables 3, 6, 9 and 10), and those effects 
were in the predicted directions. The present results agree 
with the findings of Caplan (1972), Kornfeld (1974) and Lang 
(1974), that the mean reaction time for first-clause probes 
is significantly longer than the mean reaction time for 
second-clause probes. Similarly, results support Kornfeld's 
(1974) suggestion that reaction times to probes from sub­
ordinate clauses are on the average longer than reaction times 
to probes from main clauses. Both of these findings are con­
sistent with the theoretical framework that has been pre­
sented and which is summarized as follows:
118
1. Information about sentences is stored clause by clause 
and immediate accessibility of clausal material is 
inversely related to the temporal order of the clause: 
information stored in earlier clauses is less accessible 
than information from more recently stored clauses. The 
segmentation of the sentence into clausal units is pre­
sumably accomplished by the repeated application of 
heuristic A (see Introduction, p. 22):
A: Segment together any sequence X . . . Y, in which
the members could be related by primary internal 
structural relations, "actor-action object . . . 
modifier" (Bever, 1970, p. 290).
2. The primary content of sentences is conveyed by the main 
clause; supplementary information is included in sub­
ordinate clauses. Results suggest that clausal material 
is stored in a hierarchial fashion such that primary con­
tent is more accessible than supplementary information. 
After a clausal segmentation has been accomplished by the 
repeated application of heuristic A, then the relation­
ship between those clauses can be determined by an appli­
cation of heuristic B (see Introduction, p. 32).
B: Take the verb which immediately follows the initial
noun of a sentence as the main verb unless there is 
a surface structure mark of an embedding (Fodor et al., 
(1974, p. 356).
For all the sentences of this design, the application of 
heuristic B provides a correct description of the hierarchical
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structure between the clauses: whenever the first verb of
the sentence is not the main verb, that clause is introduced 
by an adverb that is a clear surface-structure mark of the 
subordination.
In addition to expecting main effects due to both 
Probe Position and Type of Clause, an additive (or noninter­
active) relationship between the two variables was predicted. 
The basis of the prediction was its simplicity--if each vari­
able is effective, then the combination of the two variables 
together might be additively strong. The only previous 
research to simultaneously examine the effects of Probe 
Position and Type of Clause (Kornfeld, 1974), found the 
relationship between the two variables was unstable across 
various experiments. It is possible that the instability was 
due to changes in the perceptual complexity of the lexical 
items used in the various experiments. One experiment examined 
only complex sentences with adverbial clauses where the main 
verb did not allow complement constructions. Another experi­
ment studied complex sentences with adverbial, relative, and 
complement clauses. Thus, since lexical items were remarkably 
stable across the various sentence versions, sentences with 
adverbial clauses frequently contained lexical markers that 
could dominate a complement construction.
The predicted additivity did not occur. F^, F^ and 
min F' analyses showed a significant Probe Position by Type 
of Clause interaction (Tables 3, 6, 9 and 10). Figure 9 














b. M,xS ^ >  d. S,xM
Figure 9. Comparison of the differences between the 
experimental groups of design 1 (critical sentences).
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mental cells that were revealed by simple main effects analy­
ses (see also Tables 4, 7, 9, and 10 and Figure 6). Three of 
the cells do not differ significantly from each other, and 
each of the three is significantly larger than the fourth cell. 
Neale and Liebert (1973) have called such an interaction 
"terminative":
A terminative interaction is one in which two or more 
variables are clearly effective in modifying behavior, 
but, when combined, their effect is not increased over 
what either would do alone (p. 65).
For the present data, a qualifying .amendment will be added
to the definition: A terminative interaction is one in which
two variables are clearly effective in modifying behavior,
under specifiable conditions, but, when combined, their effect
is not increased over what either would do alone.
The Probe Position variable differentially effects 
reaction times only when probes are from main clauses (cell 
c.— Mx,S— is greater than cell d.--S,xM--and cell a.— Sx,M-- 
is equal to cell b.— M,xS); the Type of Clause variable dif­
ferentially affects reaction times only when probes are from 
second clauses (cell b.--M,xS--is greater than cell d.--S,xM-- 
and cell a.— Sx,M--is equal to cell c.--Ms,S--). These 
effects can be theoretically summarized as follows: the
effect of Probe Position and Type of Clause can be seen only 
when that variable operates on the level of the other variable 
that is most accessible to immediate memory. Neither variable 
is effective at the less accessible level of the other inde­
pendent variable.
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These results imply that sentential material from com­
plex sentences with adverbial clauses is retrieved by a pro­
cess that shows a ceiling effect after one increment of 
complexity. Cell d.--S,xM--involves the simplest task: 
recognizing information from a clause that is both most recent 
and most important. Cells b. and c. each add one increment 
of complexity to that task: recognition of information from 
a less important but still most recent clause (M,xS) or recog­
nition of information from the less recent but still most 
important clause (Mx,S). An inspection of the analyses of 
simple main effects (Tables 4, 7, and 9) suggests that the 
increments of complexity added by cell b. or c. are approxi­
mately equal. Moreover, since cell a.--Sx,M--is not different 
from either cell b. or c., then the implication is that the 
task associated with a. is not more complex than the tasks 
associated with b. or c. The reaction-time increment from 
two sources--probe in the first clause, probe in a subordinate 
clause— is not any greater than the reaction-time increment 
from either source considered separately.
One reason for this pronounced ceiling effect might 
be that many of the sentences included syntactically complex 
lexical markers— markers that can dominate a complement con­
struction. As noted in the introductory section on Lexical 
Analysis (pp. 25-28), such items may add perceptual com­
plexity to a sentence. Thus there may be a consistent source 
of complexity present in the experiment. It is uncertain 
whether this complexity J.nter.ac.ted with the experimental
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results. A replication of this study with syntactically 
simpler lexical items is thus necessary. If such a study 
reproduces the results of the present study, then it would 
appear that clausal information that is less accessible 
(either because of its temporal order, or because of its 
subordinate construction, or both) is held in a kind of undif­
ferentiated storage. That is, material from a clause which 
is both recent and main is placed in one category; material 
from all other clauses is placed in another less accessible 
category. There are different reasons why material may be 
stored in that second category, yet retrieval of any informa­
tion from that category involves a similar process. If, on 
the other hand, results from a study with syntactically 
simpler lexical items yield an additive relationship between 
the Probe Position and Type of Clause variables, then a more 
hierarchical storage and retrieval model would be postulated. 
That is, again, recent main-clause information would be the 
most accessible; recent subordinate-clause information and 
less recent main-clause information would be in the next 
accessible category; and less recent subordinate-clause infor­
mation would be least accessible. Should this occur, a com­
parison of the studies with simple and complex lexical items
would imply that the inclusion of more complex lexical items
/
in a sentence inhibits the discriminatory power of the 
storage and retrieval process as it applies to clausal mate­
rial.
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In siam, this study lends further support to the 
already widely held contention that listeners are sensitive 
to clausal analyses when they hear sentences. The storage 
and retrieval of information from each clause is influenced 
by the temporal order of the clause and by the main or sub­
ordinate function served by the clause in the sentence. In 
addition, the lexical complexity of the words in the sentence 
may determine the degree to which certain combinations of 
those temporal and structural variables are differentiated 
in the storage and retrieval processes.
Experimental Psycholinguistics:
Methodology (Design 2)
In the previous section, the results of design 1—  
the mean reaction times for the four groups--were discussed 
as effects of the manipulated independent variables of Probe 
Position and Type of Clause. This causal link between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable can be 
inferred when the researcher is relatively confident about the 
internal validity of the study: that is, that the comparison
groups differed only with respect to the independent variables 
under investigation. Of course^ in an absolute sense, no 
experiment is ever truly internally valid--one can always 
think of some differences between the groups other than those 
associated with the independent variables. The question is, 
what is the nature of those differences? Are they theoreti­
cally relevant, systematic, and/or avoidable? When those
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differences are brought up, what arguments are there to miti­
gate their influence on the dependent variable?
Recall that the inclusion of the filler sentences 
added to the external validity of the study. The analysis 
of data from those filler sentences (design 2) can add 
methodological strength to the interpretation of the results 
in design 1. Results from the filler analyses can contribute 
to the internal validity of the experimental study. In par­
ticular, for the present study, the filler analyses addressed 
the following questions:
1. Were there any initial differences between the groups?
If there were, then those group differences were con­
founded with the treatment differences in design 1.
2. Were there any set differences created by the addition 
of design 3 (probe types) to the study? Presumably, if 
the data from design 1 were influenced by a response set 
to some instances of a particular type of probe, then the 
data from design 2 were also equally confounded. Again, 
differences between the groups in design 2 would suggest 
that some type of confounding was present in design 1, 
and so, causal inferences about the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables would be suspect.
For the present study it was found that when the four 
subject groups were treated alike, none differed significantly 
from one another (Tables 13 and 15 and Figure 7). The mean 
differences between the groups were tested against the dif­
ferences among subjects within a group (an F^ analysis) and
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against the differences among the interactions of the groups 
with the sentences (an £2 analysis). Thus, the assumption of 
the equivalence of subject groups was supported; or, alterna­
tively, any context differences that resulted from the con­
founding of designs 1 and 3 was not large enough to infer 
that different subject groups formed different response sets. 
The results from design 1 are thus more confidently attributed 
to the effects of the independent variables of Probe Position 
and Type of Clause.
Of course, one must be cautious in infering theoreti­
cal support from nonsignificant results. Strictly speaking, 
within the Fisher model of analysis of variance, one is not 
allowed to "accept" the null hypothesis; one either rejects 
or fails to reject it. The main reason for not directly 
accepting the null hypothesis is that groups can be nonsignifi- 
cantly different because in fact, the groups are alike, or 
because the statistical test lacks power (too few subjects, 
an insensitive dependent variable, etc.). In single analyses, 
there is no way to choose between these alternatives.
Consider, however, the schematic arrangement of the 
present study: there are three distinct but related designs.
By inspecting the details of each design and comparing their 
shared features, a statement regarding relative power of each 
design can be made. Although each design has different inde­
pendent variables, the subjects, the task, and the response 
measure for all designs are identical; the same number of 
sentences are used and all sentences in the design contain
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the same number of syllables. Moreover, the sentences from 
all three designs were combined, in a random order, into one 
tape. Thus, although the data collected are separated into 
three separate analyses, the collection process itself involved 
only one experimental session. There is thus no need to 
worry about sequential or carry-over effects that typically 
might be a problem if the same subjects are used in three 
distinct experiments. Designs 2 (subject groups) and 3 (probe 
types) have comparable statistical power and sensitivity.
Both are one-way analyses of variance; both F^'sare between- 
subjects analyses; both F^'s are.repeated measures. Design 
1 (critical sentences) is a two-by-two design.
By comparing the pattern of results in the three 
designs, the nonsignificant results from the filler analyses 
(design 2) can be interpreted. In Figure 10, the means of 
the four groups are graphed separately for each design. One 
can readily see that the relationship among the four groups 
differs with each design. There is not a common overriding 
group pattern independent of the treatment conditions of each 
design. Moreover, since both the critical sentences of design 
1 and the probe types of design 3 showed significant effects, 
it is quite unreasonable to suppose that the nonsignificant 
results from the filler sentences are due to a lack of power 
or sensitivity. Rather, the implication is that the non­
significance represents a statistical judgment regarding the 
equivalence of the groups over subjects and sentences; and the 
lack of a context effect across the groups.
Design 1









Figure 10. Profiles across the four groups for 
each design.
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It is recommended therefore, that the analysis of the 
data from filler sentences become as routine a procedure as 
the inclusion of filler sentences in psycholinguistic experi­
ments. This recommendation requires that the filler analyses 
have at least as much power as the experimental analyses.
If, under those circumstances, the filler analyses support 
the assumption of equivalent groups, the experimental design 
is more internally valid than if the data from the filler 
sentences had not demonstrated the equivalence of groups.
The researcher who has found such equivalence is able to make 
a more confident statement about the liklihood of a causal 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
If the filler analyses demonstrate that the groups 
are not a priori equivalent, then the situation is more 
complicated. Information about group differences which are 
independent of experimental treatment effects can be used as 
a covariate to adjust experimental mean squares. Keppel (1973) 
outlines the logic and assumptions of an analysis of covari­
ance, and also presents the formulae necessary for computa- 
32tion. Conceptually, the information about the pre-experi- 
mental relationship among the groups is partialed out of the 
experimental analysis, and the analysis then proceeds "as 
if" the groups were initially equivalent.
The pattern of results in the filler analysis is 
compared with the pattern of results in the experimental
32See especially p. 480, where Keppel outlines the 
various situations that may warrant the use of an analysis of 
covariance.
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analysis. If the order of the groups is the same in the two 
analyses, then the experimental results are spuriously high 
due to differences between the groups that are not related
to the independent variable. The focal experiment is not
internally valid. Without knowledge about group performances 
on the filler sentences the group differences would be 
erroneously ascribed to differences in treatment. If the 
differences demonstrated by the filler analyses are of the 
same magnitude and direction as the experimental effects, 
then a Type I interpretation error could occur; that is, dif­
ferences would be attributed to,treatment effects when, in 
fact, the treatment variables are not responsible for the 
differentiation of the groups.
If, on the other hand, the order of the groups in the
filler analyses is different from the order of the groups in
the experimental analyses, then there is reason to suspect 
that the results of the experimental analysis are an under­
statement of the effects of the treatment variables. Suppose 
an analysis of the filler sentences shows that the reaction 
times of Group A are significantly greater than those of 
Group B, and an analysis of the critical sentences shows that 
the reaction times of Group B are significantly greater than 
those of Group A. In this case, the implication is that the 
treatment associated with Group B is even more powerful than 
the experimental analysis suggests since Group B had to over­
come its initial deficit relative to Group A.
Within the Fisher model of analysis of variance, a 
nonsignificant result may be due to either no effect or to
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a lack of power. It is similarly possible that a signifi­
cant result may be due to either a true effect, or to an 
excessively powerful test of significance. It is well known 
that, other things being equal, the addition of subjects 
increases the liklihood of obtaining significant results.
This means that given enough subjects--enough power--any
33difference between groups will be significant. This is one 
reason why significance alone cannot be the sole attribute of 
good research. Part of a researcher's task is to construct 
a design that has enough power to detect real differences, 
but not so much power that trivial differences become "signifi­
cant." A design that includes an analysis of the data from 
filler sentences can, as we have seen, address this problem. 
Consider the following three statistical occurrences:
1. The filler analysis is nonsignificant and the experi­
mental analysis is significant--as in the present study.
In this case if the power of the two designs is compara- 
ble--as it is in the present study--then the researcher 
has empirical evidence that the treatment differences are 
not artifacts that result from an excessively powerful 
design.
2. Both analyses are nonsignificant. There are, in this 
case, two possibilities: either the independent variable
33Meehl (1967) presents a striking illustration: he and
Lykken have collected data on 45 "miscellaneous variables" 
from 55,000 subjects. Analysis of that data indicates that 
91% of all possible pairwise comparisons are judged to be 
statistically different by tests of significance.
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had no effect or the test lacked power. If adding more 
subjects (or more materials for an analysis) results 
in significant effects for the treatment variables but 
does not change the results of the nonsignificant filler 
analysis, then the conclusion must be that the added sub­
jects increased the power of the design so that true 
effects could be detected.
3. If adding more subjects results in significant filler 
and experimental analyses (or if both analyses were 
originally significant), then the following possibilities 
exist: either the design is too powerful, and the effects
are statistical artifacts, or the added power was neces­
sary to demonstrate the treatment effects. In the latter 
case, however, the treatment effects are confounded by 
the initial nonequivalence of the subject groups. A 
comparison of the pattern of results in the filler and 
experimental analyses is necessary. As was pointed out 
earlier, an analysis of covariance may be appropriate.
In sum, data from filler sentences represents useful 
information available to the psycholinguistic researcher. 
Importantly the filler analyses can shed light on aspects of 
the internal validity of the experimental design. Moreover, 
conclusions about treatment effects are less ambiguous when 
they are integrated with a consideration of the results of 
the filler analyses. Any study that includes filler sentences 
in the presentation of the experiment, but not in the analysis 
of the results, is therefore incomplete.
Experimental Psycholinguistics:
Exploration (Design 3)
The major difference between the fillers of design 2 
and design 3 is that in design 3 subject groups are not 
treated alike: although each subject group in design 3 hears
the same sentences, the probe words for each group differ.
There is no attempt in design 3 to investigate the equiva­
lence of subject groups. Rather, this design, like design 1 
(critical sentences), assumes the equivalence of subject 
groups. Thus, an interpretation of the effects of the various 
probe types is in part determined by the results of design 2. 
Since the a priori equivalence of the groups, or at least 
the lack of a context-related nonequivalence of the groups 
can be inferred from the analyses of design 2, the differences 
between the groups (Figure 8) can be linked to the Type of
Probe that the groups received. Remember, however, that
\
design 3 represents a preliminary investigation into the sensi­
tivity of the probe task to nongrammatical variables. Thus 
inferences from this design must be quite tentative.
It was hypothesized that, if the words within a clause 
are stored and retrieved as a function of their temporal 
order, then the mean reaction time for the ADJACENT-IN group 
ought to be greater than the mean reaction time for the IN 
group. Results from Newman-Keuls analyses did not confirm 
this hypothesis. The equality of the two groups suggests 
that information about the contents of a clause is stored in
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a wholistic rather than elemental fashion. More recent infor­
mation is therefore not, in this case, more easily accessible. 
Although clause order does seem to be a perceptually salient 
aspect of sentence interpretation, the order of words within 
the clause is not necessarily perceptually salient. Of 
course, it should be noted that probed words were selected 
solely on the basis of their temporal positions in the sen­
tence. Words 18, 12 and 6 syllables from the end of the 
sentence were probed. These positions were chosen so that 
subjects would not anticipate that the probe would be from 
any particular part of the sentence. A consequence of this 
selection criterion is that probe words for both the IN and 
ADJACENT-IN conditions are from various syntactic categories: 
nouns, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs, verbs (main and 
auxiliary), conjunctions, and prepositions. In addition, 
the structural relationship between the IN and ADJACENT-IN 
probes varies considerably: sometimes the pair is from a com­
mon constituent, sometimes not; nouns and modifying adjectives 
are probed as are subjects and verbs, prepositional phrases, 
etc. It might be that when adjacent words are part of the 
same construction (i.e., a noun phrase like "young man"), 
they are stored and retrieved as a unit. Perhaps adjacent 
words that are in separate constituent structures (i.e., in a 
subject-verb relationship, the subject is in a noun phrase, 
and the verb is in a verb phrase) are stored and retrieved 
differently. There are too few probe pairs in each category 
to examine the question with the present data. It may well be
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that specific elements within a clause are stored and 
retrieved on a temporal basis, but the conditions for such a 
process need to be specified. It is not a general rule that 
all elements within a clause retain their temporal markings 
during a retrieval task.
The nonsignificance of the difference between the IN 
and ADJACENT-IN groups has an interesting implication. When 
the syntactic relationship between the probe pairs is variable, 
there is no appreciable difference in the reaction times to 
adjacent words. In the initial investigation of the clause- 
boundary effect, Caplan (1972) specifically compared subjects' 
reaction times to adjacent words that are separated by a 
clause boundary. In this case, reliable differences occurred. 
By combining the information from these two findings, the 
reaction-time differences in the clause-boundary study can be 
more confidently interpreted. They are more likely attribut­
able to the syntactic variable that assigns the probe words 
to separate clauses rather than to the differences in the 
temporal order of the two words. Caplan later avoided possi­
ble temporal-order confounding by using sentence pairs with 
different syntactic structures, but common lexical items, and 
then probing the same word in each pair member. Results from 
design 3 (that the IN group does not differ significantly from 
the ADJACENT-IN group) suggest that this added control may 
not be necessary. Any complex sentence can be used to further 
investigate the clause-boundary effect since the temporal 
order alone is not a complete explanation of reaction-time
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differences to adjacent words. Researchers perhaps then need 
not restrict themselves to sentences that have different syn­
tactic constructions but common lexical items. By using a 
wider variety of sentences, the artificiality of the experi­
mental material will be reduced, and the external validity of 
the experiment will be increased.
In design 3, groups 1 and 4 (the IN and ADJACENT-IN 
groups) had to respond as quickly as possible to probe words 
from the sentence. Recall that for design 2 (filler sentences) 
all groups performed a similar task--responding as quickly as 
possible to probe words that were usually from sentence (14 
out of 20 times). Consider the performances of groups 1 and 
4 on the related tasks of designs 2 and 3 as replications 
(see Tables 11 and 16 and Figure 10):
Design 2 Design 3
Group 1 622.23 640.80
Group 4 644.81 662.67
The comparable mean reaction times of the groups across simi­
lar tasks suggests again that groups treated alike do not 
differ--that goes for different groups receiving the same 
treatment or for the same group receiving multiple-like treat­
ments .
With the exception of the lack of a difference between 
the IN and ADJACENT-IN groups, the remainder of the predicted 
relationships between groups were supported by the Neuman- 
Keuls analyses. The mean reaction time for the OUT group was
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significantly larger than the mean reaction times for either 
the IN or ADJACENT-IN groups. In order to determine that a 
probe word is not from the sentence just presented, a sub­
ject must scan the whole sentence. For the IN and ADJACENT- 
IN conditions, when the probe was from the last clause, only 
the last clause (the most accessible one to immediate memory) 
need be scanned. In both conditions, probes were from the 
last clause in half the sentences. Since subjects in the IN 
and ADJACENT-IN groups had to scan both clauses only half the 
time, and subjects in the OUT group had to scan both clauses 
all the time, it is obvious that the mean reaction time for 
the OUT group would be longer. In addition, there is addi­
tional evidence for the suggestion that the behavior of the 
subjects in the OUT group is less variable than the behavior 
of the IN and ADJACENT-IN groups; the standard deviation for 
the OUT groups is the lowest of any of the groups (Table 21).
There is a situation in which OUT responses might be 
faster than IN responses. An incidental finding by Lang 
(1974) suggests that the shortest reaction times result from 
out probes that are content words and clearly outlandish with 
respect to the meaning of the sentence. For example:
24. Yesterday you gave me a very beautiful present
and today you gave me another one. CARBOHYDRATE 
Presumably, listeners use a heuristic in which the probe is 
compared to a more wholistic representation of the semantic 
content of the sentence. The limits of how unrelated a probe 
must be to the semantic content of the sentence before the 
heuristic is invoked has yet to be investigated.
The present study however does suggest that, if the 
probe word rhymes with a word in the sentence, the phonetic 
similarity complicates the task and increases the reaction 
time. The mean reaction time for the RHYME group is signifi­
cantly larger than each of the other three group means.
Limber and Lang (1974) found that probes which rhyme with a 
word in the sentence substantially increase the complexity 
of the probe task for individuals learning English as a second 
language. The present study is aimed at investigating this 
"confusion effect" in native speakers. The magnitude of con­
fusion that language learners experience can then be inter­
preted relative to the conclusions of this study. Moreoever, 
if a complete profile can be developed for native speakers 
which indicates not only the independent effects of various 
types of probes, but also relational effects among those 
probe types, then it is quite likely that the probe paradigm 
can provide a useful index of the listening comprehension 
skills of individuals learning English as a second language. 
The probe task allows one to investigate the automatic, uncon­
scious aspect of language use, the aspect typically least 
investigated by most standardized tests of English as a for­
eign language.
In sum, the conclusions derived from the analyses of 
Probe Types (design 3) are of a preliminary and speculative 
nature. The results suggest that the probe paradigm can be 
a useful tool for investigating the structure of the internal 
representation of a sentence. In addition, comparative
analyses of data from probe experiments with native speakers 
and those learning English might be profitably used to assess 
the proficiency of language learners.
Generality in Psycholihguistic Re's ear 
A Problem Reconsidered
Students in "Introduction to Research Methodology" 
encounter the distinction between "descriptive" and "inferen­
tial" statistics. The former are numbers (means, standard 
deviations, etc.) that summarize a particular set of data.
The latter are tests of significance that reveal the relation­
ship between the particular set of data and potential sets 
from hypothetical replications. Inferential statistics are 
aimed at quantifying the probability of replication.
In empirical research, hypothesized relationships are 
examined only on small samples. If conclusions from such 
research were limited to the particular elements sampled, 
little would be gained. Rather, presumably representative 
samples are studied, and with the use of inferential statis­
tics, conclusions are offered about the populations from which 
the samples are drawn. Tests of significance involve, there­
fore, a mechanical approach to the problem of induction (see 
Introduction, pp. 35-41).
Scientific Research: "Soaked In Theory"
Interesting and useful research is thus necessarily 
inferential. Yet is is a mistake to equate the inferential
research with inferential statistics. Statistics or tests of 
significance are prescriptive procedures. They provide the 
researcher with a set of rules and regulations which, taken 
together, represent a formal, standardized approach to induc­
tion. Induction, however, may be far too problematic to sub­
mit to a ritualized procedure. As Hume argued, inductive 
inferences are always based on insufficient evidence; one can 
never be sure that what is inferred in any way reflects what 
exists. This is especially true of theoretical inferences; 
there is no procedure which insures that theoretical generali 
zations are coherent and consistent with one's results. More 
over, it is a mistake to assume that theorizing occurs (and 
should occur only) after the data is collected and statisti­
cal significance established, though many psychologists still 
believe, apparently, that they put on the theoretician's hat 
only when they discuss their results (see e.g. Bakan, 1966; 
Rozeboom, 1960; Greenwald, 1975). In fact, it appears that 
the entire scientific enterprise, from first observations to 
final proofreading is, as Popper has said, " . . .  soaked in 
theory" (1976, p. 132). Philosophers of science who agree on 
little else still conclude unanimously that theorizing comes 
first and last in science (e.g. Kuhn, 1970; Polany, 1958; 
Popper, 1962). Inductive inferences, long the preoccupation 
of experimental psychologists, and now of psycholinguists, 
always occur in the service of a theory.
Induction is, both the pride and the problem of 
science. The aim of research is to infer beyond the informa-
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tion given; but it is difficult to establish for those 
inferences "beyond." Fisher (1955, 1960) and Clark (1973, 
1976) have suggested that statistical criteria--tests of sig­
nificance- -can solve this problem (see Introduction, pp. 37- 
40). Clark has expanded on the Fisher model of analysis of 
variance by reminding researchers that they are simultane­
ously sampling from both subjects and materials populations.
He believes that, unless appropriate statistical procedures 
are used (ex: quasi-F or min F' analyses), the inferences
"beyond" have no statistical support and so are "unreliable" 
and "can lead to serious error" (1973, p. 335). Wike and 
Church (1976) have rejected Clark's statistical refinements 
and proposed instead that the limits of induction should be 
established empirically by means of replications (see Intro­
duction, pp. 41-45).
Clark (1973, 1976) and Wike and Church (1976) suggest 
different solutions to the problem of induction. Yet implicit 
in the two approaches is a belief that the problem of induc­
tion can be solved by prescriptive rules (be they statistical 
or empirical). Some specific procedure is outlined, and 
adherence to this procedure is a necessary prerequisite for 
reliable inductive inferences. Induction becomes a conse­
quence of some mechanical sequence. Either an F statistic or 
a count of successful replications is held to be the necessary 
and sufficient criterion for induction. Both approaches 
neglect the role of theory and thus each is inadequate.
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Kaplan (1964) has captured the irony and futility of psy­
chologists ' excessive dependence on procedure:
. . .  in contemporary behavioral science the attitude 
toward experimentation is in danger of becoming a kind 
of ritualism as though the laying on of hands can itself 
effect a cure of diseased ideas. As with all rituals, the 
emphasis passes from content to form, from substantive 
questions to procedural ones, and virtue comes to be 
localized in the proper performance of fixed act 
sequences, (p. 146)
Using the present study as an example, it will be demon­
strated that results from statistical and empirical manipula­
tions are of interest only when those maneuvers are embedded 
within an explicit theory.
The Inadequacy of a Purely Statistical Solution: The
Min F 1. Clark (1973) has suggested that " . . .  almost every­
one . . .  is committing the language-as-fixed-effect-fallacy" 
(p. 355)--that is, that conclusions from research are likely 
to be based on spuriously high F-ratios that result from 
testing effects with an inappropriate error term (one that is 
too small). By "doing the right statistics" (p. 347), 
researchers are safe from Type I error epidemic (incorrect 
rejection of Ho) that can result from the fixed-effect-fallacy. 
In studies that have not adhered to these procedures, Clark 
implies that a reanalysis will probably show that significant 
results are limited to the linguistic sample investigated.
Both Clark (1973) and his critics (Wike and Church, 1976) 
have described quasi-F and min F' analyses (the right statis­
tics) as conservative tests. To Clark, this is a desirable 
trait, necessary in order to avoid Type I errors. To his
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critics, conservative tests are to be avoided since their 
usage can lead to an epidemic of Type II errors (incorrect 
failure to reject Ho).
The Use of Power. Although the min F' is a conserva­
tive test because it mathematically uhderestimates the value 
of the quasi-F ratio, it is not necessarily an inherently 
stringent test. In and of itself, the min F' neither 
encourages nor discourages Type I or Type II epidemics. The 
min F' test is a set of sequential procedures that blindly 
operate on strings of numbers. It is part of the research 
process to deliberately coordinate a specific design with a 
particular statistical test. In order to effectively make 
use of any statistical test, researchers must therefore be 
aware of the concept of power, the probability of correctly 
rejecting the null hypothesis. A proper consideration of 
power involves fitting the strength of an hypothesized effect 
and the sensitivity of the statistical tests used to measure 
that effect. In order to set up an experimental design and 
chooSe an appropriate test for the analysis, researchers must 
thus be knowledgeable about the theoretical assumptions that 
underlie statistical testing, and have a theoretical and/or 
empirical basis for hypothesizing a specific magnitude of 
effect. The popular but misconceived notion of a very strin­
gent test is really a case of an inappropriate power match 
between design and analysis, in particular, the design may 
lack power.
The statistical remedies suggested by Clark (quasi-F 
and min F' tests) appear to be overly stringent tests because 
the analysis often does not fit the design (see Introduction, 
pp. 41-45). When past studies are reanalyzed, originally 
significant effects become nonsignificant. It is not neces­
sarily that the effects do not generalize across language 
materials, but rather that the design was not explicitly con­
structed to test that possibility. Both quasi-F and min F' 
analyses are new to most researchers. If they blindly apply 
the new computational formulae to traditional designs, they 
should hardly be surprised by failures to confirm experi­
mental hypotheses. The addition of a second random factor 
to the design (as is required by quasi-F and min F' tests) 
results in a substantial reduction of power. Researchers not 
familiar with the new procedures will not be able to take 
this into account when designing their experiments. In 
Clark's (1973) description of his newly proposed min F' test 
(which is a combination of the subjects analysis and the 
materials analysis), he implies that the sensitivity of the 
test is purely a statistical matter: "an experimental design
is only as sensitive as the less sensitive of the two sub­
designs it contains" (p. 349). But that cannot be true. It 
is not statistical tests, per se, that are sensitive or 
insensitive, but the minds of researchers. Those minds con­
tain theories (Implicit or explicit) , and it is on the basis 
of those theories that researchers select their design and 
analysis.
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Clark is quite correct in pointing out that psycho- 
linguistic researchers have failed to consider the implica­
tions of sampling from a population of materials as well as 
from a population of subjects. Indeed, it is obviously true 
that research is carried out on a small sample of linguistic 
materials, but inferences are applied to a much larger set.
The legitimacy of the inference however, does not rest ulti­
mately on the outcome of a test of significance. Results of 
a test of significance are of interest only if the power of 
the test is large enough to detect true effects (differences 
that are theoretically meaningful), but not so large that 
trivial differences are judged significant."^ Achieving this 
match between an experimental design and a test of signifi­
cance requires more than the blind adoption of a new statisti­
cal procedure. It requires an understanding of the properties 
and how they interact with the properties of experimental 
design. If a new procedure which treats two factors as ran­
dom leads to a loss of power, the researcher must know this 
and then consider aspects of experimental design that will 
increase the power of the test.
In the present study an attempt was made to equate 
the relative power of.the subjects analysis (F^) and the 
materials analysis (£2). As a preliminary step, the number 
of subjects was equated with the number of materials. However,
■^Again, the example described in Meehl (1967) and in 
footnote 33 clearly illustrates the importance of distinguish­
ing between differences that are only statistical judgments 
and differences that are both theoretical and statistical 
judgments.
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the subjects analyses were between subject designs, while the 
materials analyses were repeated measures designs. Thus the 
materials analysis is more powerful than the subjects analy­
ses. But this is a satisfactory situation since Clark (1973) 
has implied that it is often the materials analysis that is 
the weaker of the two and so provides the upper bound for the 
min F'. Note, however, that for the critical sentences, the 
F values from the subjects analyses are smaller than the F's 
from the materials analyses (see Tables 3 and 6). In future 
research, if the subjects design is between subjects and the 
materials design is a repeated measures, perhaps the number 
of materials could be less than the number of subjects.
In this situation, where the statistical tests of sig­
nificance are relatively new and unfamiliar, the methodologi­
cal role of the filler sentences is emphasized. The numbers 
of subjects and sentences are the result of an educated guess 
about the strength of hypothesized effects when measured by 
subjects and materials analyses. Thus, it is quite important 
that the design in which the fillers are analyzed be as power­
ful as that of the experimental analysis. Otherwise, subject 
and material numbers could be excessively increased to the 
point where Type I errors would be a strong possibility.
The combination of significant experimental results 
(critical sentences--design 1 and probe types--design 3) and 
nonsignificant filler results (design 2) suggests that, in 
the present study, the power of the tests of significance was 
large enough to detect meaningful differences, but not so
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large as to be sensitive to trivial differences. Moreover, 
the significant results of this study make it clear that, 
when attention is paid to both the subject and material fac­
tors of a design, an analysis that considers both factors as 
random need not be thought of as excessively stringent (see 
Table 10).
Defining a Population. Clark (1973, 1976) has pre­
sented statistical procedures for analyzing a design that con­
tains two random variables. In addition to the traditional 
subjects variable, Clark recommends that researchers consider 
the materials variable to be random. Otherwise, in his view, 
psycholinguistic researchers commit the fixed-effect-fallacy:
Investigators . . . almost never provide statistical evi­
dence that their findings generalize beyond the specific 
sample of language materials choices. Nevertheless, these 
same investigators do not hesitate to conclude that their 
findings are true for language in general. (1973, p. 335)
The implication is that if the "right statistics" are used,
then, and only then, may researchers unhesitatingly conclude
that "their findings are true for language in general."
Clark is, as we have seen, concerned only with the 
statistical basis for making generalizations. If the min F' 
is large enough, one may generalize findings; if the min F' is 
not large enough, one may not so generalize. Yet, even if 
researchers present statistical evidence that they generalize 
beyond their sample, one may still ask: to what population
should the generalization be applied? Clark's prescription 
for generalizing to "language in general" is surely not cor­
rect. The experimental materials are never selected from
"language in general." A useful definition of linguistic 
populations must come from a theoretical conception of the 
variables being investigated.
In the present study, all experimental analyses 
resulted in significant min F' values (see Table 9). The 
effects of the Probe Position and Type of Clause variables are 
presumed to be_reliable across changes in both subject and 
material populations. But what exactly are those populations? 
Before the implications of the analyses were discussed, salient 
characteristics of the populations were made explicit (see 
Discussion, pp. 116-117).
Defining a population is not an unambiguous task.
Many alternative descriptions can correctly characterize any 
set of language materials. Decisions regarding which charac­
teristics are or are not salient, are contingent upon the 
theoretical psycholinguistic knowledge of the researcher. For 
example, it is not obvious from an inspection of the critical 
sentences (see Appendix A) that syntactically complex lexical 
items were used. Within the framework of a psycholinguistic 
theory of sentence processing, however, it is meaningful to 
group lexical items according to their syntactic and per­
ceptual complexity (see Introduction, pp. 25-28, on lexical 
analysis). Thus, the deliberate use of syntactically complex 
lexical items implies that the attribute of perceptual com­
plexity is a necessary part of the description of the popula­
tion. It may well be that the results generalize to popula­
tions of sentences with less complex lexical items, but the
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consideration of that possibility is beyond the scope of this 
present study.
Although the statistical significance of a study can­
not change with time, its theoretical significance can. 
Theoretical advances often lead to changes in the way the 
materials are described and therefore to changes in the popu­
lation to which the results are generalized. For example,
Lang (1974) does not mention that all the sentences used in 
her probe study contain verbs that are syntactically and per­
ceptually simple. It is possible that findings from that 
study are applicable only to sentences from a population of 
perceptually simple verbs. Conversely, future research may 
suggest that the variables of Probe Position and Type of 
Clause operate independently of the types of lexical items 
contained in the sentence. If so, results from the present 
study will have added generality.
In sum, the results of appropriate tests of signifi­
cance can provide useful information about the probability 
of replication, but only under specified conditions: if a
different sample of subjects is drawn from the same population 
if a different sample of materials is drawn from from the 
same population. It is, however, the researcher--not the test 
of significance--who defines the population. That definition, 
moreover, is based on a theoretical understanding of the 
variables under investigation.
The Inadequacy of a Purely Empirical Solution: The
Replication. Levy (1969) has described the myth of a perfect
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replication. Changes from study to study are inevitable.
But, the question is, are these changes to be interpreted as 
"nuisance" variables, evidence of the limitations of behav­
ioral research, or are some at least to be interpreted as 
intentional variations that are the consequences of explicit 
attention to theory. It is only the results from experiments 
that incorporate some of this latter form of variation that 
can be incorporated into an argument describing the generality 
of a phenomenon.
In the present study, interest in the variables of 
clause order and type of clause is based on a theory of sen­
tence interpretation that explicitly incorporates both 
structural and perceptual aspects of language (see Introduc­
tion, pp. 2-34). Within this conceptual framework, the 
results of a number of studies have been compared (see Intro­
duction, pp. 46-51, and Discussion, pp. 116-124). It is 
from those studies that the variables of interest in the pre­
sent study have emerged. The salient characteristics of the 
populations from which the samples were derived have been 
described and suggestions have been made for future research 
which can both replicate and extend the present findings (see 
Discussion, pp. 116-139).
A Theoretical Approach to Induction:
Problems, Not Solutions
In sum, inductions from samples of subjects and 
materials to broad populations are not made more plausible by
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rigid adherence to ritualized "fixed act sequences." Clark's 
major contribution, therefore, is not that he has told 
researchers which error term to use in order to properly 
analyze experimental results. Rather, his critique of psy­
cholinguistic experimentation has usefully directed the 
attention of researchers to the need to explicitly consider 
the materials factor. It is also clear, however, that 
researchers need to go beyond Clark to a realization that a 
statistical treatment of materials presupposes an explicit 
theoretical treatment of the materials factor. Similarly, 
the suggestions of Wike and Church are useful not because 
their replicatory prescriptions can, in part or in sum, help 
a researcher to increase the generalizability of experimental 
results. They instead have simply reminded researchers of a 
viable nonstatistical method for collecting evidence of gen­
erality. But this method also presupposes an explicit theo­
retical treatment of the relevant variables (including the 
materials factor).
Researchers must present an argument for the gen­
erality of their results. Statistical and empirical evidence 
may be used in the argument, but the evidence is not the 
argument, per se. Rather, such arguments derive their force 
from the theoretical sense they make.
Summary of Results and Suggestions
for Future Research
Clausal, lexical and surface-structure analyses are 
an integral part of any theory of sentence interpretation.
Using the probe paradigm, design 1 of the present study 
examined the effects of two variables related to the descrip­
tion of adverbial and main clauses in complex sentences: the
temporal order of the clause (whether a probe was from the 
first or second clause of the sentence) and the type of clause 
(whether a probe was from the subordinate or main clause of 
the sentence). In addition, although only complex sentences 
with adverbial clauses were considered, the lexical items of 
each sentence readily allow for the later construction of 
complement-clause versions of each sentence. Thus, the sen­
tences with adverbial clauses frequently contained lexical 
markers (main verbs, head nouns, modal auxilaries, or adjec­
tives) that could dominate a complement construction. All 
initial subordinate clauses contained surface-structure cues 
that marked the embedding.
It was found that although the main effects for both 
variables were significant (the reaction time to first-clause 
probes was longer than the reaction time to second-clause 
probes; and the reaction time to probes from subordinate 
clauses was longer than the reaction time to probes from main 
clauses), a significant interaction qualified those results. 
In particular, the effect of clause order was significant
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only for main clauses, and the effect of type of clause was 
significant only for clauses in the second position.
These results suggested a storage and retrieval model 
for sentential material in which clausal information that is 
less accessible (either because of its first position 
temporal order, or because of its subordinate construction, 
or both) is held in a kind of undifferentiated storage. 
Material from a clause which is both recent and main is placed 
in one category; material from all other clauses is placed in 
another less accessible category. This may be the way the 
temporal order and type-of-clause variables interact in all 
situations; or, it may be that this pattern is restricted to 
complex sentences with adverbial clauses that contain syn­
tactically complex lexical markers. Future research can 
explore the effects of syntactically simple lexical items and 
other clausal constructions (relative and complement).
The use of filler sentences in the present experiment 
increased the external validity of the experiment. (External 
validity refers to the extent that the sample or laboratory 
situation is an accurate copy of the population or "real 
world" to which one wishes to generalize the results.) With 
the inclusion of filler sentences, the array of sentences pre­
sented to subjects was not the repetitive structural array 
that would have resulted from a presentation of just experi­
mental sentences. In addition, when filler sentences were 
combined with experimental sentences, the heterogeneity of the 
complete sentence set disguised the intent of the study and
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therefore decreased the liklihood that subjects would form 
uniform and correct predictions about what they should do on 
succeeding sentences.
For the filler sentences (design 2), all subjects 
heard the same sentences and the same probe words. The filler 
sentences were thus a variable of "no treatment" across the 
four subject groups studied. For the filler analyses, the 
predictions were for nonsignificant results. In order to 
infer theoretical support, rather than just a lack of power, 
from those null results, two other distinct but comparably 
powerful designs were examined (designs 1 and 3). Significant 
results were predicted and found for those two designs. Thus, 
the analyses of the data from the filler sentences was inter­
preted as support for the hypothesis of the initial equality 
of the groups; or, by an alternate interpretation, the analyses 
supported the hypothesis that the different contexts that the 
filler sentences were presented in (the unique combination of 
treatments from designs 1 and 3) did not affect the perfor­
mance of subject groups on an identical task. Both of these 
interpretations added a measure of internal validity to the 
study. (Internal validity refers to the extent that a 
researcher can eliminate competing hypotheses about the reason 
for the differences among the experimental groups.) The 
differences between the experimental groups in designs 1 and 
3 were more confidently attributed to the manipulated vari­
ables rather than to any pre-existing differences between
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the groups or to any set differences that might have resulted 
from the different probe types that each group received.
In design 3, four different probe words were used for 
each sentence. It was found that probes not from the sen­
tence (both OUT's and RHYME's) evoked longer reaction times 
than probes from the sentence (both IN's and ADJACENT-IN's). 
One plausible interpretation of these results is that, in 
order to determine that a particular word was not from that 
sentence, the entire sentence must be scanned, while the task 
of determining the inclusion of a probe word from the sentence 
is completed as soon as that word is scanned. Thus, scanning 
an entire sentence should take longer than scanning only a 
portion of it.
Probes that rhyme with a word from the sentence, 
evoked longer reaction times than probes unrelated to any word 
in the sentence. The phonetic similarity between the probe 
word and a word in the sentence adds a measure of confusion 
to the task. This confusion effect has also been found in 
students learning English as a second language (Limber & Lang, 
1975) . Future research can consider a direct comparison of 
the magnitudes of the confusion effect for native speakers 
and second-language learners. It may well be that the magni­
tude of such an effect can be used as an index of listening 
comprehension skills.
A comparison of the reaction times to probe words that 
are adjacent to each other in the sentence was included in 
this research as a preliminary step toward investigating
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within-clause variables involved in sentence processing. The 
finding that the IN and ADJACENT-IN group reaction times did 
not significantly differ from one another suggests that the 
variable of temporal order of words within a clause should 
be studied more subtly. In particular, the perceptual variable 
of word order should be examined under separate structural 
conditions such as adjective-noun, subject-verb, verb-object, 
etc.
In this exploratory research, the effects of only 
four different probe words were compared (IN, OUT, RHYME, 
ADJACENT-IN). Future experimentation with other probe types 
can shed light on additional aspects of sentence interpreta­
tion. The possible confusion effect of synonomous probes 
(probes that are semantically related to a word in the sen­
tence) has yet to be systematically investigated with either 
native speakers or second-language learners. A study of the 
effect of outlandish, probes (probes that are obviously unre­
lated to the message of the sentence) could lead to the 
formulation of a heuristic that listeners use: when the
probe word is clearly unrelated to the semantic content of 
the sentence, don't scan the whole sentence, just guess that 
the word was not from the sentence. Again the performance of 
native speakers and second-language learners could be com­
pared.
For all three designs, both subjects and language 
materials were conceptualized and analyzed as random factors. 
Results from a subjects analysis (F^) and a materials analysis
(F^) were combined to produce min F 1 statistics for each 
effect. In all cases, effects that were significant in one 
analysis were significant in all analyses; effects that were 
nonsignificant in one analysis were nonsignificant in all 
analyses. Results supported the view that, if the power of 
the underlying F^ and F^ analyses are comparable, then the 
min F; is not an overly stringent test of experimental 
hypotheses; although it is a mathematically conservative test 
(that is, it underestimates the quasi-F statistic).
The results from the three designs are thus reliable 
over the subject and material populations sampled. The 
statistical procedures associated with tests of significance 
do not, however, specify the populations sampled. It is the 
researcher, drawing on the theoretical framework that sur­
rounds the study, that defines the populations that the find­
ings generalize to. Similarly, empirical generalization can 
be achieved when the results of research findings are inte­
grated with an explicit theoretical framework to produce sug­
gestions for future research. Both the populations investi­
gated, and directions for future research, have been outlined.
In summary, the probe paradigm is a versatile research 
tool. It can be used to investigate clausal, lexical, and 
surface-structure analyses in sentence interpretation. Fur­
ther, aalient within-clause structures and strategies can be 
explored. Finally, explicit attention to methodological 
aspects of design and ^ analysis will increase the confidence
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that a researcher has in the internal and external validity 
of the study.
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List of Critical Sentences 
These sentences are revisions of adverbials used by 
Kornfeld (1974). All sentences are 24 syllables long and 
the probe word is always 12 syllables from the end.
1. LAND
a. When the greedy rancher began purchasing land, 
farming plots became quite scarce in Suffolk county.
b. The greedy rancher tried to purchase farms when land 
was becoming more and more scarce in Suffolk county.
c. The greedy old rancher tried to purchase more land 
when farms were becoming scarce in Suffolk county.
d. When the greedy old rancher began purchasing farms, 
land quickly became quite scarce in Suffolk county.
2. CAR
a. Since a highly-skilled mechanic worked on the car, 
the engine was back in good running condition.
b. The mechanic worked on the engine since the car was 
not in a very good running condition.
c. The mechanic worked for a long time on the car since 
the engine was in very bad condition.
d. Since the mechanic worked on the engine, the car is 
again in very good running condition.
3. TIME
a. If you can prepare the meal ahead of time you can 
relax a little while before dinner.
b. You could prepare the meal ahead, if you want time 
for leisurely conversation before dinner.
c. You surely could prepare the meal ahead of time if 
you want to take a short rest before dinner.
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d. If you can cook the meal ahead, you will have time
for leisurely conversation before dinner.
JUDGE
a. Because our lawyer was rude in front of the judge, 
we naturally became extremely angry.
b. Our lawyer should have been less rude because the 
judge of the court was becoming more and more angry.
c. Our lawyer should have been much less rude with the 
judge because the trial was important to us.
d. Because our lawyer was so rude in court, the judge 
of the case naturally became quite angry.
FARMERS
a. Ever since feed costs increased greatly for farmers,
there have been grave problems in the economy.
b. Feed costs have been increasing ever since farmers
have had many other economic problems.
c. Feed costs have been increasing greatly for farmers
ever since the recent economic problems.
d. Ever since feed costs have increased greatly,
farmers have had many other economic problems.
6. PLANTS
a. Ever since we used special insect spray on plants, 
the leaves have been safe from attacks of small 
aphids.
b. We've used insect spray on leaves ever since the 
plants were attacked by several kinds of tiny aphids.
c. We have used special kinds of insect spray on plants 
ever since the leaves were attacked by small aphids.
d. Ever since we used insect spray on leaves, the plants 
have been safe from most attacks of tiny aphids.
HIGHWAYS
a. Because the repairs had started on the parkways, 
heavy traffic was jammed up during the rush hour.
b. Some of the repairs were stopped because the parkways 
jammed up with heavy traffic during the rush hour.
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c. Some of the road repairs were stopped on the park­
ways because traffic was jammed up during the rush 
hour.
d. Because the road repairs had started, the parkways 
jammed up with heavy traffic during the rush hour.
8. CHIEF
a. Because the rookie gave false reports to the chief, 
the officers on the police force were upset.
b. The rookie checked in right away because the chief 
of the police force was very upset with him.
c. The new officer had to report to the chief, because 
the entire force was upset with him.
d. Because the officer gave false reports, the chief of 
the police force was very upset.
SQUAD
a. After the sergeant gave the order to the squad, the 
men were ready for the enemy soldiers.
b. The sergeant gave several orders after the squad was
surprised by attacking enemy soldiers.
c. The sergeant gave several quick orders to the squad,
after the men were surprised by the enemy.
d. After the master sergeant gave orders, the squad was
ready for all of the enemy soldiers.
10. SINGER
a. After the band quarreled often with the singer, she 
was finally fired by the director.
b. The band had many quarrels, after the singer was 
finally fired by the director himself.
c. The band had many quarrels about the singer, after 
she was fired by the director himself.
d. After the band had many quarrels, the singer was 
finally fired by the director himself.
11. CLASS
a. Because there was always so much noise from the class, 
the teacher was in trouble with the principal.
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b. There should really be much less noise, because the 
class could get into trouble with the new principal.
c. There should really be a lot less noise from the 
class, because the teacher could get into much 
trouble.
d. Because there was so much noise from the room, the 
class was in serious trouble with the principal.
12. GROUNDS
a. Because that lazy caretaker ignored the grounds, the 
yard soon turned into an overgrowth of weeds.
b. That caretaker ignored the yard because the grounds 
were too big to keep free of weeds and overgrowth.
c. That lazy caretaker ignored most of the grounds, 
because the yard was too big to keep free of weeds.
d. Because the caretaker ignored the yard, the grounds 
soon turned into an overgrowth of ugly weeds.
13. BOOKS
a. Now that efficient clerks have audited the books, 
the company's accounts are kept right up to date.
b. The clerk audits efficiently now that the books of 
the company are all kept right up to date.
c. The new clerk can efficiently audit the books, now 
that the accounts are all kept right up to date.
d. Now that the clerk audited the accounts, the books 
of the company are all kept right up to date.
14. HOUSE
a. If you'll put new screens on the windows of the 
house, the rooms will be free of insects all summer 
long.
b. You might put new screens on the windows if the 
house is usually full of most kinds of insects.
c. You might put new screens on the windows of the 
house if the rooms are usually full of insects.
d. If you'll put up new screens on the windows, the 




a. Because the nurse hung some bright pictures on the 
walls, the rooms looked a lot more cheerful to the 
patients.
b. The nurse hung up some bright pictures, because the 
walls of the rooms would look cheerful to many 
patients.
c. The nurse hung up many bright pictures on the walls 
because the rooms would then look a lot more cheer­
ful.
d. Because the nurse hung up some bright pictures, the 
walls of the rooms looked more cheerful to many 
patients.
16. COFFEE
a. Although retail prices are quite high for coffee, 
tea continues to sell at a good bargain price.
b. Prices are very high for tea, although coffee is 
very much a bargain by comparison.
c. Many retail prices are quite high for coffee, 
although tea continues to be quite a bargain.
d. Although retail prices are high for tea, coffee
still continues to sell at a good bargain price.
17. SHOWERS
a. Before swimmers in the gym had used the showers,
there was always a large supply of hot water.
b. All the swimmers used the gym before the showers no 
longer had any hot water supply left.
c. All of the swimmers in the gym used the showers 
before the hot water supply was depleted.
d. Before many swimmers used the gym, the showers had 
an ample enough supply of hot water.
18. COEDS
a. Though the dean answered the demands of the coeds, 
the dorm committee will hardly be satisfied.
b. The dean answered all the demands, though the coeds 
of the dorm council will hardly be satisfied.
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c. The dean should respond to demands of the coeds,
even though the dorm will hardly be satisfied.
d. Even though the dean answered the demands, the
coeds of the dorm council will hardly be satisfied.
19. MATCH
a. After your partner was confident of the match you 
both won spots in the national tournament.
b. Your partner was more calm after you won the match 
easily in the national squash tournament.
c. Your tennis partner was confident of the match after 
you both won the national tournament.
d. After your partner was more calm, you won the match 
easily at the national squash tournament.
20. PLOT
a. Even before many knew details of the plot, Water­
gate was brought to the public's attention.
b. Politicians knew the details before the plot of 
Watergate was brought to public attention.
c. A few politicians knew details of the plot even 
before the Watergate was made public.
d. Before many knew all the details, the plot of 
Watergate was brought to public attention.
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APPENDIX B
List of Filler Sentences
Design 2
All sentences are 24 syllables long. All subjects heard 
the same sentences and the same probes.
Probes 18 syllables from the end:
S/M 1. Whenever I don't eat a good balanced 
meal, I feel much more tired and run­
down than usual.
2. Even though you are not an Italian, 




3. Let's go out to dinner tonight 
because the afternoon meeting 
usually gets over late.
4. It was pleasant to sit by the glow­
ing fireplace while we talked about
the events of the past year.
5. This morning we got up later than
than usual but we still managed to 
get to class on time.
6. The local radio station is planning 
a fund-raising marathon and they 
need volunteers.
7. Their new furniture was delivered 
and they were surprised by how 
beautiful the room now looked.
Probes 6 syllables from the end:
S/M 8. Whenever I feel the least bit tired 











9. Because the spring term ends in three 
weeks, some students are already at 
work on their final projects.
M/S 10. The young man always polished his 
brown shoes with such care because 
he wanted them to last a long time.
11. Jim brewed a cup of hot cinnamon tea 
for her because he noticed she was 
was feeling a bit cold.
coordinate 12. Today we will go to the dress
designer and we will select the style 
for the special long dress.
13. I have read your beautiful letter 
many times, and each time it brings 
me more pleasure than before.
14. That couple will be married soon, and 
so they are both very busy with 
wedding details right now.
Probes not from the sentence:
S/M 15. Whenever we are in a hurry, we often 
seem to forget about the most impor­
tant things.
M/S 16. The children continued to enjoy their
new record even though they had
played the songs many times.
18. Grandma really likes to get letters 
from both of us, and we enjoy writing 
to her very much.
19. We went for long walks over the week­












20. The students complained about the 
difficulty of the test, but the 
instructor would not listen. SNOW
APPENDIX C
List of Filler Sentences
Design 3
All sentences are 24 syllables long. Each sentence 
has four different probes. Each subject heard only one 
probe type.
Probes 18 syllables from the end:
S/M 21. Because the tall, young man was so strik- .
ingly handsome, he looked terrific in all 
kinds of clothing.
MAN YOUNG PAN JOB
22. While we are on our walk tonight, let's see 
if any of the neighborhood houses have 
their lights bn.
WALK OUR TALK TOAST
M/S 23. You should sit down and rest immediately,
whenever you begin to feel the least bit 
dizzy.
REST AND GUEST CHEESE
24. They both did a good job of cleaning the
house today because they had invited guests 
for dinner.
JOB GOOD ROB SMILE
coordinate 25. We are planning our trip to Colorado this
summer, but first we have to save up the 
money.
TRIP OUR SLIP HAIR
26. Martha likes to walk three miles every day, 
but sometimes when it's snowing or raining 
she does not walk.













2 syllables 'from the end:
Because of the exam next Monday, I will not 
be able to go on the ski trip this weekend.
NOT WILL POT PLANT
Often, when you are teaching in the morning, 
I like to go over to the library and read.
I MORNING SKY JUICE
I am ready to do a lot of walking this 
, winter because I bought a new pair of warm 
boots.
THIS WALKING KISS FACE
I felt very quiet and relaxed.when we were 
listening to the classical music last night.
WERE WE FUR RABBIT
Six months ago Jim decided to let his beard 
grow and now he needs to trim it just once 
a week.
BEARD HIS WEIRD LETTER
They were both very hungry when they got 
home, but soon after supper they were full 
and satisfied.
BUT HOME CUT GOLD
The instructor spent hours preparing for 
class, and all his lectures were thoughtful 
and organized.
CLASS FOR GLASS CHAIN
We will fly to New England in a month but 
right now we have to work out the travel 
arrangements.
RIGHT BUT HEIGHT REVIEW
syllables from the end:
Whenever you begin reading one book, it 
always reminds you of things you've read in 
other books.
THINGS OF STRINGS SNACK
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36. After the big fire in the neighborhood, 
people checked to see if they had enough 
insurance.
THEY IF CLAY CLOCK
M/S 37. The young man was becoming quite impatient
because his tiny cut did not seem to be 
healing.
DID CUT HID WINK
38. Let's go to the library for a few hours
because we both have much work to do by 
tomorrow.
WORK MUCH JERK TEACH
coordinate 39. Your weekend visit was very enjoyable, and
the letter you wrote later was quite thought­
ful.
WROTE YOU QUOTE DRESS
40. Tonight we should write a letter to Ronda
and we should send it air mail special 
delivery.
MAIL AIR SAIL HOUND
175
APPENDIX D
Random Order of Stimulus Sentences
Cl through C20 represent the critical sentences.
FI through F20 represent the filler sentences of design 2.
F21 through F40 represent the filler sentences of design 3.
Tape Sentence Tape Sentence
Position Number Position Number
1. F39 31. F 7
2. F 2 32. C 9
3. F30 33. F 9
4. F26 34. C12
5. C13 35. F22
6. F 6 36. F 3
7. F13 37. F23
8. F25 38. C 3
9. CIO 39. C17
10. F18 40. Fll
11. C19 41. F38
12. F20 42. F40
13. C 4 43. F16
14. C18 44. C14
15. F28 45. F29
16. Cll 46. F 4
17. F 8 47. F12
18. F24 48. F31
19. C 2 49. C20
20. F20 50. C 7
21. F17 51. F 1
22. C 8 52. F36
23. F21 53. F34
24. F33 54. C 6
25. F14 55. F37
26. F 5 56. C15
27. F19 57. F15
28. C 5 58. C 1
29. F27 59. C16
30. F35 60. F10
APPENDIX E 
Instructions
This is an experiment in auditory perception. You 
will hear a series of test sentences. After each sentence, 
you will hear a word which may or may not have been in the 
previous sentence. Your task is to push the lever to the 
position marked "IN" if the word was from the previous 
sentence or to the position marked "OUT" if the word was not. 
It is important to respond as quickly as possible. If you 
think that you made a mistake, you may correct it before 
going on to the next sentence.
In order to help you, a short tone has been placed 
just after the sentence. You must judge if the word that 
follows the tone was in the previous sentence. After you 
have responded, you will hear another tone that will signal 
the beginning of the next sentence.
The word that follows the sentence may be a word from 
the sentence (in which case you would respond IN) or it may be 
a word totally unrelated to any words from the sentence (in 
which case you would respond OUT), or it may be a word that 
rhymes with a word in the sentence (again, however, in these 
cases you would respond OUT).
Turn over the index card in front of you and look at 
the three example sentences:
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1. In spite of the college population, Allendale
is a small town. COLLEGE
2. This is a good area to shop for antiques. PENCIL
3. The new rug makes our living room much cozier. HUG 
In the first sentence, the test word COLLEGE is from the 
sentence. Therefore, the correct response would be IN.
PENCIL is not in the second sentence, so the correct response 
would be OUT. For the third sentence, although HUG rhymes 
with rug, the word hug is not in the sentence, so OUT would 
be the correct response. Please turn over the index card.
Two of the three sentences will not be presented as
if they were the test sentences. Please push the lever to
the appropriate IN or OUT position as quickly as you can
after you hear the test word. If you are ready, the two
example sentences will be presented.
In spite of the college population, Allendale is 
a small town. COLLEGE
This is a good area to shop for antiques. PENCIL
In addition to responding IN or OUT immediately
after you hear the test word, two or three times during the
experiment you will also be asked to paraphrase the sentence
that you just heard.
We are now ready to begin the experiment. Remember
that your primary task is to press the lever to the IN or OUT
position as quickly as possible after you hear the test word.
Do you have any questions?
